tata safari storme interior 360 view

Digital Showroom

• Accessories

Service Products

Book a service, service connect app, owner's manual, bluetooth™ compatibility, general tips, fuel saving tips, best value service, value added services, recall information, android auto user guide, information on warranty.

• Exchange Car
• Dealer Locator

News and Events

Drive NEW FOREVER. A whole new range of cars from Tata Motors.

The New Safari

The New Safari carries on the legendary lineage with contemporary and premium updates. The New Safari is a compelling combination of Grand Design, Cutting-edge Technology & Luxurious Comfort . It is also the Safest Vehicle in India with highest 5 star rating from GNCAP.  

Showroom price in

• Please Enter the Nearest City
• CHIKKAMAGALURU
• UTHAMAPALAYAM
• NAGARKURNOOL
• KARUNAGAPALLY
• URULI KANCHAN
• SECUNDERABAD CANTT
• KOOTHATTUKULAM
• SAWAI MADHOPUR
• CHUMUKEDIMA
• BIHARSHARIF
• MADANAPALLE
• CHANGARAMKULAM
• KUNNAMKULAM
• MADANAPALLI
• BULANDSHAHR
• PITHORAGARH
• RUPNARAYANPUR
• NARASARAOPET
• THAKURDWARA
• CHENTHRAPINI
• THIRUVALARCHI PATTI
• HARIHARGANJ
• RAGHURAJNAGAR
• SINGHESAR ASTHAN
• KOTHAMANAGALAM
• SIDDHARTHNAGAR
• BAIKUNTHPUR
• BHUPALPALLY
• MANDI DABWALI
• KUTTIPPURAM
• VIRUDHACHALAM
• TIRUCHIRAPPALLI
• BHUPALPALLE
• LAKHIMPUR KHERI
• ANANDPUR SAHIB
• CHERUVATHUR
• MACHILIPATNAM
• MAHENDRAGARH
• JAGATSINGHPUR
• HANUMANGARH
• METTUPALAYAM
• MUVATTUPUZHA
• KANJIRAPALLY
• PERINTHALMANNA
• JOGINDERNAGAR
• KARUNAGAPPALLY
• VASAI-VIRAR CITY
• JHANJHARPUR
• FARRUKHABAD-CUM-FATEHGARH
• CHANGANASSERY
• SREEKANDAPURAM
• MUZAFFARPUR
• SEMMANCHERI
• ASHOK NAGAR
• MUDHAL TITTA
• TIRUCHENDUR
• MALIKIPURAM
• CHITRADURGA
• TALIPARAMBA
• FATEHGARH SAHIB
• NEEM KA THANA
• DHRANGADHRA
• BISWANATH CHARIALI
• KOTTARAKKARA
• BALODA BAZAR
• ROBERTSGANJ
• VALLABH VIDYANAGAR
• KHARIAR ROAD
• ALLIANCE CITY
• IRINJALAKUDA
• TIRUCHIRAPALLI
• KALLAKKURICHI
• PARLAKHEMUNDI
• THAMARASSERY
• NEDUMKANDAM
• KUSHAL NAGAR
• RAJAHMUNDRY
• KHED SHIVAPUR
• KRISHNANAGAR
• SHAHJAHANPUR
• NORTH LAKHIMPUR
• GUMMIDIPOONDI
• CHHATTARPUR
• THIRUVALLUR
• CHITTAURGARH
• THIRUVILWAMALA
• DEVANAHALLI
• PATHANAPURAM
• CHADAYAMANGALAM
• SRI MADHOPUR
• TIRUVANNAMALAI
• DELHI ADMIN QUARTERS
• BHAWANI MANDI
• UDUMALAIPETTAI
• THALAYOLAPARAMBU
• COOCH BEHAR
• YAMUNANAGAR
• CHANDIKHOLE
• CHENGALPATTU
• VIZIANAGARAM
• HIMAYAT NAGAR
• SRI GANGANAGAR
• RAMGANJ MANDI
• MANANTHAVADY
• NAILA-JANJGIR
• TIRUNELVELI
• NEYYATTINKARA
• CHILAKALURIPET
• CHIDAMBARAM
• SIKANDRABAD
• HOSHANGABAD
• PERUMBAVOOR
• BHADRACHALAM
• CHANDRAKONA CK ROAD
• MIRYALAGUDA
• FARRUKHABAD
• SECUNDERABAD (CB)
• MAHABUBABAD
• KRISHNAGIRI
• BHUBHANESWAR
• KODUNGALLUR
• GANDHINAGAR
• MUZAFFARNAGAR
• BALRAMPUR(RURAL)
• SHIKARIPURA
• GUDUVANCHERI
• PASCHIMI SINGHBHUM
• RAJNANDGAON
• SULTAN BATHERY
• BHAWANIPATNA
• MAYILADUTHURAI
• MANENDRAGARH
• KALYANPUR HOUSING
• VITTHAL UDYOG NAGAR
• MURWARA (KATNI)
• KARANPRAYAG
• LAL BAHADUR SHASTRI NAGAR
• 1 OLD JUDICIAL COMPLEX
• CHARKI DADRI
• PUDUKKOTTAI
• DHARMANAGAR
• JOGINDARNAGAR
• IBRAHIMPATNAM
• KALLAMBALAM
• ANANDA NAGAR
• SECUNDERABAD
• PAONTA SAHIB
• AMBALA CITY
• BHUVANAGIRI
• NORTH GUWAHATI
• SURENDRANAGAR
• CHAMRAJNAGAR
• VIRUDHUNAGAR
• PAZHAYANNUR
• CHIKKABALLAPUR
• KURUKSHETRA
• BHARAT NAGAR
• BAHADURGARH
• CHANNARAYAPATNA
• KANCHEEPURAM
• GANGAPUR CITY
• KAVATHE MAHANKAL
• HUBBALLI-DHARWAD
• MAVELIKKARA
• WADAKKANCHERY
• BHARANIKAVU
• NARSIMHAPUR
• SRIKALAHASTI
• KUCHAMAN CITY
• PATHANAMTHITTA
• VISHRANTWADI
• VISAKHAPATNAM
• NAVI MUMBAI
• GANJ BASODA
• ICHALKARANJI
• FARIDABAD - SEC 81
• MOHANLAL GANJ
• THIRUVANANTHAPURAM
• TALEGAON DABHADE
• BACHED (38)
• NARAYANGAON
• MAHBUBNAGAR
• BHUBANESWAR
• PATHIRIPPALA
• RAJAPALAYAM
• SRIPERUMBUDUR
• RAMANATHAPURAM
• JEYPORE L/R
• RAJAKILIPAKKAM
• JAGGAIAHPET
• CHITTORGARH
• DALSINGHSARAI
• MATTANCHERRY
• VISHAKHAPATNAM
• PONDICHERRY

offer(s)** available

Starting from

Variants available

Get Efficient. Go Eco-Friendly

Benefits upto 1.4 Lakh* for selected variants.

* Prices indicated are Ex-showroom prices. Prices are subject to change without prior information at discretion of Tata Motors. Contact your nearest Tata Motors dealer for exact prices.

** Offers are subject to change without prior information at discretion of Tata Motors. Contact your nearest Tata Motors dealer for offer details.

The Grand Design

The new safari showcases an artistic sensibility that’s sophisticated, assertive and way ahead of its time

• New Parametric Grille

First impressions should always leave an indelible mark. The New Safari’s Parametric Grille is designed to do just that. It makes the frontal stance bolder and masculine, captivating the onlooker instantly.

Bi-LED Projector Head Lamp

Experience the elegance and enhanced visibility of the new powerful Bi-LED lamps in the new Safari. Light up the road as you move ahead.

Sequential LED DRLs & Centre Position Lamp

Let the world notice your presence, and be mighty impressed, with it. The New LED DRLs and Centre position lamp accentuate the road presence of your New Safari elevating its overall appeal.

• Signature Connected LED Tail Lamp

Now your goodbyes, too, will be hard to forget. The beauty with which you leave will keep your admirers wanting for more, waiting for you to make an entry and get going again.

• New R19 Dual Tone Spider Alloys

Made to rule the road, these alloys add to the masculine persona of the New Safari. The aero inserts are thoughtfully integrated to enhance the aerodynamics and all-round aesthetics.

• Signature Safari Mascot on doors

Owning a Safari is a matter of pride. Now be reminded of it every time you get in or out. And feel great about taking the legacy forward.

• Iconic Roof Rails with Chrome Inserts

Leave an unforgettable impression with our iconic roof rails. They not only highlight the SUV's design but also bestow it with a commanding, masculine presence.

• Bi-LED Projector Headlamps
• End to End Connected LED DRL

• Oyster White & Titan Brown Interior Theme

The rich yet subtle interior theme elevates the whole Safari experience to another level. A delight to the senses, it makes you feel that the best the world has to offer is all around you, in your New Safari.

Persona Based Dashboard with Mood Lighting

Uniquely elegant and luxurious aesthetic of the Dashboard elevates the ambience of Your Safari.  Persona based interior theme to offer a unique experience.

• New Dual Tone 4 Spoke Steering Wheel with Illuminated Logo

Hold it, and you'll be transported to the future. The new steering comes with illuminated Logo & Leather wrapped to make your drive experience premium.

• Benecke Kaliko Oyster White Leatherette Seats

Reserved only for you, these ultra-premium Leatherette seats come with deco stitch that elegantly ties comfort with style.

• Persona Based interior themes

Explore our complete range of cars from the comfort of your homes

Everything that the new safari offers is protected at all times, under any condition.

The Safest Space

Everything that the new safari offers is protected at all times, under any condition

• GNCAP 5 Star Rating
• Pedigree of OMEGARC
• Advanced ESP with 17 Features*
• Emergency Call/Breakdown Call

• Electronic parking Brake (EPB) with Auto Hold

Take your safety to the next level with our new Auto Hold Function, a traffic essential. Its user-friendly, fail-safe, space-saving features embodies our commitment to simple and utility-driven design.

• 360° Surround View system

Nothing can get in the way of you having a safe drive. We have your back, front, left, right and center, all in high definition.

3-Point ELR Seat Belt for all Passengers with Reminder

Elevate your Safety standard with 3-point seat belt for all passengers. Crafted with care for every occupant's safety and comfort, it includes seat belt reminder system for all passengers.

• Hill Hold Control

If always going uphill is your vibe, then the New Safari has the means to make it totally hassle-free. Because when you’re going up, you don’t really enjoy coming down.

• 3 Pt ELR Seat Belt with Reminder for All occupants

A highly-intuitive Companion that's build to take on surprises and make your driving truly seamless.

• Autonomous Emergency Braking

Leave no room for uncertainties on road with Autonomous Emergency Braking. The ADAS system monitors the surrounding to identify probable collision scenarios with vehicles, pedestrians and cyclists and if required applies brake automatically* to ensure that you and others stay safe from any harm.

• Forward Collision Warning

Protects vehicle from front collisions by alerting the driver of any danger in the front through Audio-Visual warning.

• Rear Collision Warning

The ADAS system monitors and alerts you of any incoming speeding vehicle in the rear of your vehicle through audio and visual alerts. It also alerts the driver of incoming vehicle to take necessary actions by blinking of hazard lamps.

• Traffic Sign Recognition

You might miss the traffic signs sometimes, but now your car won't. The ADAS system monitors traffic sign boards like "Speed Limits* "No Overtaking* and provides you with inputs so that you can take necessary corrections if required.

• High Beam Assist

Now drive freely on the roads without having to worry about distractions caused by oncoming vehicles. High Beam Assist automatically adjusts headlights from high to low beam when oncoming vehicles are detected.

• Lane Departure warning

 Your car now helps you to stay alert on road by informing you about the things you are unaware of.

The ADAS system monitors lane markings and warns you of any un-intended deviation from the lane.

• Blind Spot Detection

Blind spots can take you by surprise even on your best days.

Blind Spot Detection system monitors vehicle's surrounding to identify any blind spots and alerts you of any possible hazard through audio-visual warnings so that you can take precautionary actions.

• Lane Change Alert

 Your car now helps you to stay alert on road by informing you about the things you are unaware of. The ADAS System monitors the surrounding and warns you of any dangerous lane change

• Rear Cross Traffic Alert

The system prevents you from getting startled by objects approaching or present in the rear blind spot of the vehicle and alerts you through audio and visual alerts which help in easy and safe reversing.

• Door Open Alert

Helps in ensuring safer door opening by alerting Driver and/or passengers of any imminent danger through Alerts.

Performance

The Power Play

When supreme power is under the feet, the thrill of driving becomes greater

KRYOTEC 170 PS BS6 Ph2 Diesel Engine

Power and performance go hand in hand with the 2.0 L KRYOTEC diesel engine that gives out 170 PS power and 350 Nm torque.

• Smart E-shifter

Drive easy with a dash of style. This Smart E - Shifter in the New Safari not only adds to the convenience of gear shifting but is also sophisticated in its design.

Paddle Shifters

Maneuver the daily chaos with utmost ease. Shift to a futuristic way of maintaining complete control on your Safari without having to take your hands off the wheel.

Bejewelled Terrain Response Modes with Display

No matter what the road, you have just the mode to conquer it. Each mode meticulously fine-tunes the Safari’s performance to suit the driving condition.

• Multi Drive Modes

Made for a different you under different driving conditions. The New Safari is designed to cater to every unique need, allowing you to truly enjoy various driving dynamics effortlessly.

• Kryotec 170 PS BS6 Ph2 Diesel Engine
• Paddle Shifter
• Bejeweled Terrain Response Modes with Display

The Tech Appeal

The new safari comes loaded with tech that takes charge of elevating all those on-road experiences.

31.24 cm Harman™ Touch Screen Infotainment

Now every drive in the New Safari is going to be captivating. Equipped with high resolution screen so big, that it will transform your Safari into a cinematic cockpit.

• 26.03 cm Digital Instrument Cluster

Every inch of detail is adapted dynamically to suit your current driving situation. The big multifunctional screen gives you all the information on the go so that you can focus on driving.

JBL™ Music System with 10 Speakers

Stay connected with your Safari in real time. A range of connected features are here to assist you with all the latest updates about your car and also allow you to remotely operate.

Harman™ Audioworx Advanced with 13 JBL™ Audio Modes

An immersive acoustic experience awaits your senses in the New Safari. You will feel the base, hear every beat and lose yourself in the melody of your choice.

Wireless Android auto ™ & Apple Carplay ™ over WiFi

Pair your gadgets and access the content on your smartphone seamlessly. So that you stay connected on the go without taking your eyes off the road.

Multiple Voice Assistants including Alexa™

The New Safari is at your command, in the language of your choice. Choose from a range of Voice command including Alexa™  with Car2Home connectivity.

• 31.24 cm Harman Touch Screen Infotainment
• JBL Music System with 10 Speakers
• Harman Advanced AudioworX with 13 JBL Modes
• Android auto ™ & Apple Carplay ™ over WiFi
• Multiple voice assistants including Alexa

Connected Vehicle Technology with iRA

Customer Delight

The Comfort Zone

The new safari is the epitome of revered elegance and desired calmness.

Voice Assisted Panoramic Sunroof with Mood Lighting

The sun and the stars are both aligned for you to enjoy the view at your command. As you gaze at the stars above, let our integrated sunroof mood lights paint your view with a spectrum of colors.

Gesture Controlled Powered Tail Gate

Open the tailgate even when you have your hands occupied. A simple swipe of the leg under the boot and it opens effortlessly, adding comfort to your everyday routine.

6-way Powered Driver Seat with Memory & Welcome function

Effortless comfort, maximum luxury. The new Safari's 3-step memory storage function elevates your seating experience with ease.

4-Way Powered Co-Driver Seat with Electric Boss Mode

Embrace the power of position. The Boss Mode buttons positions the co-driver seat to unlock maximum legroom, letting you relax and savor the journey ahead.

2nd Row Comfort Head rests & Rear Sun Shades

Now enjoy every journey with more comfort. The New Safari comes with comfort headrest & Sunshades in 2nd row so that you are well rested even in long drives.

Luxurious 3rd Row Seats

Step into the new Safari and relish best-in-class comfort, even in the third row. The back seaters will appreciate ample under-thigh support, convenient mobile charging ports, and smart space holders.

3rd Row AC Vents

In the new Safari, every passenger counts. With a 3-step blower adjustment and smartly positioned vents, we guarantee uninterrupted airflow, even in the harshest weather conditions, no matter your chosen seat.

Intelligent Spaces

For all things big and small, there’s a special place in the New Safari. These thoughtfully created spaces make storage easy and the journey convenient.

Air Purifier

Step into your sanctuary on wheels. Breathe in fresh air, breathe out all your worries. And always stay rejuvenated.

Wireless charger & 45 W C-Type Fast Charger

Just as your vitality never fades, your mobile's battery too will never fail with our blazing 45W C-type charger & built in wireless charging pad.

Front Arm Rest with Cooled Storage

Chilling is easy with thoughtfully designed spaces, right in the front.

Auto Headlamps & Rain Sensing Wipers

Nothing can hamper your visibility. Not the darkness. Not even the rain. Thanks to these intelligent inclusions, every journey is a breeze.

Find Dealership

Find a Tata Motors car dealerships nearest to you, using the dealer locator.

Schedule a Test drive

We know you will love our cars, which is why you can book a test drive online at the nearest dealership.

Use our compare tool to find the best model for you and your family.

Set your monthly or total budget criteria to get the variants within your budget.

Request a call back

Thanks for providing your details,

our team will be in touch as soon as possible.

Request a Test Drive

To revisit this article, visit My Profile, then View saved stories

Test drive: Tata Safari Storme

A capable off-roader that can roll in the mud, but still looks good enough to take to a black-tie event

The Tata Safari was one of the first real Indian SUVs we could buy before we had the likes of Scorpios, Fortuners and Captivas prowling the Indian roads. Expectedly, the Safari soon came to enjoy a steady fan following amongst Indian SUV buyers. Nearly 12 years after the first Safari rolled out of the production line in Pimpri, Tata Motors has overhauled the interior and exterior – and they’ve called it the Storme.

The Storme comes with a brand new front end. Gone is the smiley, traditional Tata face up front, now replaced with a more purposeful and aggressive front end replete with flared headlamps, a new honeycomb grille job, bumpers and a flatter front. The restyling continues to the rear of the car with flatness being the overarching theme. New tail lamps and the repositioned spare wheel, which now goes under the SUV, cleans up the rear.

Tata seems to have borrowed the styling from Land Rover, thereby retaining a rugged, yet contemporary appeal. Stepping into the Safari Storme, and settling down into the high-seating position offers a throne-like commanding view of the road up front. While the previous-generation of Safaris had bad plastics, yawning panel gaps and overall drab interiors, the Storme comes with soft touch plastics, faux wood inserts and a new dashboard design. While the seven-seater is comfortable for five adults, the last two side-facing jump seats in the boot are best used for shorter distances. In terms of feature and creature comforts, Tata has given the Storme a reverse camera which displays on the inner rear view mirror, reverse parking sensors, a DVD touchscreen infotainment system and safety features like twin airbags, ABS and EBD.

Powered by a 2.2 liter 140 hp - 320 Nm VariCOR turbo-diesel engine, the motor feels smooth and responsive. The gearbox housing has been changed to reduce pesky vibes. The 0-100 kph sprint comes up in about 16 seconds, and if you were to give it enough road, it will top out at about 150 kph (impressive for an SUV that weighs close to two tonnes). Transmission is by means of a five-speed gearbox, which did feel notchy although Tata claims to have improved shift quality.

While the throws were short, the shift quality leaves a lot to be desired. The Safari has always been a steady handler, and the Storme now gets the lighter hydroformed chassis from the Aria. Handling is also quite good for an SUV, probably better than even a Scorpio. That said, the Storme being a body-on-ladder top-heavy SUV, it does have its limitations in the twisties and doesn't like changing direction rapidly. Off the road, the Storme is quite a good package for soft off-roading and mud plugging, what with the shift-on-the-fly 4X4 drive system working quite well to get it out of trouble. The Storme is a big improvement over the older Safari, although quite a pricey one at Rs 13.66 lakhs (ex-showroom Delhi) for the top-end version.

Jay is the editor of indiancarsbikes.in, a blog dedicated to motorcycle and cars.

Audi S4 Test drive: Porsche Boxster S Test drive: Audi Q7 V12 TDI Test drive: Volvo S60

GQ Recommends

Tata Safari Storme 360 View

• Also See: Tata Safari Storme Price
• Love to see in different colours click here: Tata Safari Storme Colours

Share Your Comments About Tata Safari Storme tools with your Friends

• Home » Tata Cars » Tata Safari Storme Car » Tata Safari Storme Car 360 View

• Honda Rebel 500
• Kia Sonet Kia QYI
• 2020 Hyundai i20
• Royal Enfield Meteor 350

Tata Safari Storme Interior Review

Clamber into the Tata Safari Storme and you immediately feel the uplifted ambiance of the cabin. The interiors are all beige and that for a typical Indian customer means rich.

[Interior quality and design have greatly improved but uneven panel gaps do exist]

The Safari Storme's cabin is a much better place to be, compared to the old Safari. The dashboard layout and design are hugely improved and are ergonomically sound.

[Headlamp controls are shifted to dashboard to make way for audio controls]

The overall quality of the plastics is clearly several notches above the previous car but still uneven panel gaps are to be found here and there. There are few low rent bits scattered around the cabin like the tacky AC vent adjustor and poor quality control stalks.

[The analogue clock is neatly placed and the new center console looks much better]

As far as the design is concerned, the four-spoke steering wheel with silver inserts is new and can be adjusted for rake. The all-new centre console is finished in faux wood and houses a neatly integrated analogue clock and centre AC vents, the controls for the HVAC, and an Alpine music system (we will talk about it a little later). There are two bottle holders ahead of the gear knob; also there is a useful storage compartment above the centre console.

[The AC has an economy mode the spread is quick and even throughout the cabin]

The dashboard is split horizontally by a faux wood strip and the side AC vents have silver highlights. The beige color does a good job of providing an airy feel but on the flipside, it becomes responsible for the annoying glare on the front windshield.

[Rear arm rest contains a storage space; The rear AC controls are mounted on the roof]

The front seats are high, very comfortable with lumbar adjustment and offer a good view of the road. If you fancy a truck like driving position, the driver’s seat has height adjustment. Both the front seats get armrests and the driving position is nice and comfortable.

[Jump seats are only for children and the space is better used with the seats folded]

The controls for the headlamps are now shifted to the dashboard, below the right AC vent, to make way for the audio controls on the stalk. Now that brings us back to the Alpine music system. It has Bluetooth connectivity and the sound quality from the speakers is excellent.

The Tata Safari was always known for its superb middle row of seats and in fact that was one of the primary strengths of this SUV. We are happy to inform that hasn’t changed with the Storme. The rear seats are supremely comfortable as always, with adequate thigh support and easily pass the test as the best in the segment. The legroom is ample even with the front seats pushed all the way back.

The Safari Strome’s rear passenger compartment contains two jump seats which are large enough for children but the adults will start complaining in few minutes into the journey. The step provided is totally useless while alighting and hence the jump seats are strict no no for senior citizens.

Fold the seats and the luggage space available is adequate and the net provided is useful in preventing the things from flying around.

Overall, the cabin quality is a big leap ahead, the space on offer is fantastic and the design of interiors has improved from the old car, a lot more than the new exterior suggests.

You might also like

100 New Tata Electric Buses Ready to Serve the Public in this Indian City

How Tata Motors Transformed Livelihoods of 2,000 Farmers

New Tata Nexon EV Dark Edition To Be Launched In The Coming Months

Tata Safari Adventure Persona Imagined As A Hard-Core Offroad-Spec SUV

Tata Nexon Diesel Lineup Loses Four Variants - Full Details

'Free Tata Safari Offer' Turns Out To Be A Chinese Scam!

Most Viewed

2025 Nissan Armada PRO-4X Unveiled: Ultimate Off-Road Flagship

1.5 Million BMW Cars Affected by Integrated Braking System Fault

BYD M6 Electric MPV Debuts in Thailand

High-Performance Nissan Ariya NISMO Debuts on World EV Day

Renault to Unveil New Concept Car at IAA Transportation Show

Xpeng G6 Secures Five-Star Euro NCAP Safety Rating

Android Auto Users Face Ongoing Google Maps Issues

Truck Safety Takes Priority: Euro NCAP’s New Rating System in Action

Yamaha R15M Carbon Fibre Pattern With New Features Launched in India

• Car Reviews

Tata Safari Storme review, test drive

• Introduction
• Performance
• Ride and Handling

Tata has drafted in a successor to the Safari after 14 long years. But is it good enough to revive the carmaker's fortunes in the SUV segment?

Published on Jan 21, 2013 07:33:00 PM

1,42,666 Views

New dash design looks modern and quality has taken a big leap over the old car.

On the inside, the dashboard is totally redesigned and, while not unique, it is pleasing to look at. But more than anything, it’s the Safari’s improved quality that gets your attention. Right from the soft-touch plastics on the dashboard to the chrome detailing on the door handles and gear lever, everything plays a part to make the cabin far more upmarket than before. It also feels far better put together, though it’s still too early to pass judgement on long-term durability. However, the interior is still not perfect. Bits like the power window switches, air-con controls, and the seat height and steering adjusters are still not up to scratch. Even the aftermarket single-DIN music system looks out of place in this day and age, where integrated two-DIN music systems are more or less the norm. But when you compare it to the other home-grown SUVs, the Storme’s cabin is still the best built.

What you will unquestionably like the Safari for is its space. The large windows allow plenty of light to enter the cabin but, surprisingly, the front seats aren’t as comfortable as before. They are rather flat, offer a bit too much thigh support, and there is an excess of lower back support. The seatback is too firm as well. Still, front-seat height and steering rake adjustment help make finding the ideal driving position easy, and general ergonomics are good too. Middle-row passengers will like the seat for its sofa-like comfort. It’s wide enough to seat three and there’s enough support for your thighs as well. In stark contrast, the third row is far from comfortable or practical. The tiny, foldable jump seats are only usable on short journeys at best. With them folded, you can make space for luggage, but if you need to travel heavy, you can fold the middle row forward too.

Equipment-wise, the Storme is a bit of a mixed bag. You get all the essential features, but some helpful features like a reversing camera (which was offered on the earlier Safari) are missing.

Tata Altroz

₹ 7.56 - 13.54 lakh

₹ 11.30 - 22.57 lakh

Tata Curvv EV

₹ 20.21 - 25.37 lakh

Tata Harrier

₹ 17.85 - 28.55 lakh

₹ 9.18 - 18.44 lakh

Tata Nexon EV

₹ 17.06 - 23.02 lakh

₹ 6.65 - 11.82 lakh

Tata Punch EV

₹ 12.76 - 17.34 lakh

Tata Safari

₹ 18.43 - 32.41 lakh

₹ 5.82 - 8.71 lakh

Tata Tiago EV

₹ 9.24 - 13.79 lakh

₹ 6.00 - 10.02 lakh

Tata Tigor EV

₹ 14.48 - 15.62 lakh

N Chandrasekaran talks about Tata's comeback, future plan...

3488 Views | 7 days ago

Deep Drive Podcast: Tata Punch's rise to the top of the s...

4675 Views | 13 days ago

Tata Curvv EV video review

12111 Views | 1 month ago

Shailesh Chandra on Tata Curvv expectations, new ATLAS pl...

2521 Views | 1 month ago

Copyright (c) Autocar India. All rights reserved.

Member Login

Personal details.

No comments yet. Be the first to comment.

Change City

Pick from popular cities, need an expert opinion on your car and bike related queries, search by car price.

Cars between ₹ 5-10 lakhs

Cars between ₹ 10-15 Lakhs

Cars between ₹ 15-20 Lakhs

Cars between ₹ 20-40 Lakhs

Cars between ₹ 40-60 Lakhs

Cars between ₹ 60-80 Lakhs

Cars between ₹ 80 Lakhs - 1 Crore

Cars above ₹ 1 Crore

Poll of the month

Do you think coupe-SUVs will be popular in India?

Yes, the shape helps them stand out

No, the look polarises opinion

Only if they don't sacrifice practicality

Sign up for our newsletter

Get all the latest updates from the automobile universe

Tata Safari Storme Images & Videos

Tata safari storme images.

Explore more on Tata Safari Storme

Tata Safari Storme

Safari storme competitors images.

User Reviews

Popular suv cars.

Explore More Options

• Tata Cars /
• Safari Storme /

• Mahindra Thar Roxx vs Tata Safari Storme [2012-2015]

CarWale brings you comparison of Mahindra Thar Roxx and Tata Safari Storme [2012-2015]. The Mahindra Thar Roxx price is Rs. 12.99 Lakh and Tata Safari Storme [2012-2015] price is Rs. 10.46 Lakh. The Mahindra Thar Roxx is available in 1997 cc engine with 1 fuel type options: Petrol and Tata Safari Storme [2012-2015] is available in 2179 cc engine with 1 fuel type options: Diesel. Thar Roxx provides the mileage of 12.4 kmpl and Safari Storme [2012-2015] provides the mileage of 14 kmpl.

Thar Roxx vs Safari Storme [2012-2015] Comparison Overview

• SPECIFICATIONS
• USER REVIEWS

Specifications and Finance

User reviews, more expert reviews on thar roxx and safari storme [2012-2015].

By Vikrant Singh 01 Sep 2024

By Pratheek Kunder 29 Jan 2015

By Vikrant Singh 17 Aug 2024

Thar Roxx comparison with similar cars

Safari Storme [2012-2015] comparison with similar cars

Thar Roxx vs Safari Storme [2012-2015] Comparison FAQs

• Compare Cars

Search form

• Publications
• Get Involved
• Planned Giving

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 8, 2024

Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan

August 8, 2024, 10pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

The data cut-off for this product was 2:45pm ET on August 8. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 9 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Note: Russian sources are currently shifting much of their reporting to cover the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and as a result are not providing the same level of detail about the situation along the frontline in Ukraine.

Ukrainian cross-border mechanized offensive operations into Kursk Oblast that began on August 6 are continuing as part of a Ukrainian operational effort within Russian territory. ISW will not offer assessments about the intent of this Ukrainian operation in order to avoid compromising Ukrainian operational security. ISW will not make forecasts about what Ukrainian forces might or might not do or where or when they might do it. ISW will continue to map, track, and evaluate operations as they unfold but will not offer insight into Ukrainian planning, tactics, or techniques. ISW is not prepared to map control of terrain within Russia at this time and will instead map observed events associated with the Ukrainian incursion into Russian territory as well the maximalist extent of claims and unverified reports about Ukrainian advances. Maximalist claims and unverified reports about Ukrainian advances within Russia do not represent territory that ISW assesses that Ukrainian forces have seized or control. Inferring predictions about Ukrainian operations from ISW maps and assessments that do not explicitly offer such predictions is inappropriate and not in accord with their intended use.

Geolocated footage and Russian claims indicate that Ukrainian forces continued rapid advances further into Kursk Oblast on August 8, and Ukrainian forces are reportedly present in areas as far as 35 kilometers from the international border with Sumy Oblast. Ukrainian forces most certainly do not control all of the territory within the maximalist extent of Russian claims about Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast, however. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced as far as Kromskiye Byki and Molyutino (up to 35 kilometers from the international border and 17 kilometers southeast of Lgov) but noted that these are small groups not immediately trying to hold territory. [1] Russian milbloggers issued contradictory claims about Ukrainian positions in Sudzha (northeast of Sumy City and roughly 10 kilometers from the international border), with some milbloggers claiming that Ukrainian forces seized the settlement while other milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces only seized part of the settlement. [2] Geolocated footage published on August 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces likely advanced towards Russkoye Porechnoye (north of Sudzha), and Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces also advanced further north of Sudzha along the 38K-024 highway near Anastasyevka. [3] Geolocated footage published on August 7 and 8 shows Ukrainian forces operating within Goncharovka (just west of Sudzha) and north of Zaoleshenka (northwest of Sudzha), and a Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces seized Goncharovka. [4] A geolocated photo shows Ukrainian forces operating within Novoivanovka (10km north of the international border and northwest of Sudzha), and Russian milbloggers also claimed that Ukrainian forces seized Novoivanovka and Bogdanovka (northwest of Sudzha). [5] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces also advanced northwest of Sudzha into Malaya Loknya and to the outskirts of Cherkasskoye Porechnoye; northeast of Sudzha near Kruglenkoye, Martynovka, and Bolshoye Soldatskoye; and east of Sudzha near Mirny, although two Russian milbloggers denied claims that Ukrainian forces are operating near and within Bolshoye Soldatskoye. [6] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack near Korenevo (north of Sumy City and roughly 23 kilometers north of the international border) and that Ukrainian forces attacked within Snagost (south of Korenevo) and near Olgovka (east of Korenevo). [7]

Russian milbloggers claimed that small Ukrainian armored groups are advancing further into the Russian rear and bypassing Russian fortifications before engaging Russian forces and then withdrawing from the engagements without attempting to consolidate control over their furthest advances. [8] Russian milbloggers noted that the prevalence of these armored groups is leading to conflicting reporting because Ukrainian forces are able to quickly engage Russian forces near a settlement and then withdraw from the area. [9] Ukrainian forces appear to be able to use these small armored groups to conduct assaults past the engagement line due to the low density of Russian personnel in the border areas of Kursk Oblast. Larger Ukrainian units are reportedly operating in areas of Kursk Oblast closer to the international border and are reportedly consolidating and fortifying some positions. [10]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are successfully fielding novel and innovative tactics and technological capabilities during operations in Kursk Oblast. Russian milbloggers have provided details on Ukrainian tactics and technological capabilities that they regard as innovative, but ISW will not describe such details at this time or point to specific sources in order to preserve Ukrainian operational security.

The Kremlin will almost certainly endeavor to retake Russian territory in Kursk Oblast that Ukrainian forces have seized and stop Ukrainian activity further into Russia, as substantial Ukrainian advances within Russia would be a strategic blow to Russian President Vladimir Putin's decades-long effort to cement a legacy of Russian stability, security, and geopolitical resurgence. Putin held a virtual meeting with Kursk Oblast Acting Head Alexey Smirnov on August 8 about Ukraine's operations into the oblast and stated that he "generally know[s] the situation" but still would like to hear Smirnov's assessment of the situation. [11] Smirnov and Putin did not discuss Russian attempts to repel Ukrainian forces and portrayed the Russian government as effectively working to ensure civilian safety and social and monetary compensation. Russian milbloggers have highlighted concerns over the safety of Russian civilians and disorganized civilian evacuations. [12] Putin likely assesses that he must respond to the perceived threat to civilians in order to assure the Russian public that the situation is under control and avoid significant domestic discontent. Smirnov claimed on August 7 that the situation is "under [Putin's] personal control," directly linking Russian success in repelling Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast and mitigating related civilian issues to Putin. [13] The Kremlin previously has portrayed itself as capable of swiftly responding to pro-Ukrainian raids into Russia, and the Kremlin likely assesses that significant Ukrainian territorial gains in Russia would pose a threat to the Kremlin's efforts to frame itself as a stable regime in control of the internal security situation within Russia and an effective manager of the war in Ukraine. [14]

If Russian reporting on the situation in Kursk Oblast is accurate and if the Russian military command perceives the situation to be the same as Russian sources have described, then the Russian military command has an array of likely courses of action (COAs) it could pursue to respond to the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast. ISW is not prepared at this time to assess which of these possible COAs is most likely, and it is possible that the Russian military command may not rely on only one COA to respond to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast. The Russian military command's decision-making will be influenced by its perception of the size and capability of Ukrainian forces in the area, about which ISW makes no assessment. The following COAs are not presented in order of likelihood.

• COA 1: The Russian military command may decide to use existing conscripts, Federal Security Service (FSB) border guards, Rosgvardia, and other irregular forces already deployed to the international border area to push Ukrainian forces back and defend against the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast. Russian authorities have repeatedly assured Russians that conscripts will not deploy to combat operations along the frontline in Ukraine, and instead, the Russian military command has relied on conscripts for staffing units in charge of border security functions along the international border with Ukraine. [15] Russian conscripts, FSB border guards, and elements of Chechen "Akhmat" units operating under the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) are reportedly currently operating in Kursk Oblast. [16] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 8 that Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) irregular forces, including elements of the "Dikaya Division of Donbas," the "Pyatnashka" Brigade, the "Arbat" Separate Guards Special Purpose Battalion, and the "Night Wolves" drone detachment, arrived in Kursk Oblast. [17] Elements of a battalion of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division's 217th VDV Regiment were reportedly defending a section of the border in Kursk Oblast as of late May 2024, suggesting that there may be some relatively more combat effective forces in the area, but the majority of Russian reporting indicates that most Russian forces operating in Kursk Oblast are elements of less combat effective units. [18] The Russian military command may pursue this COA should it assess that lower quality forces that would likely be less well equipped could effectively stop Ukrainian forces that have been reportedly successfully employing innovative tactics and technological capabilities. All of these forces are operating in the area of responsibility (AOR) of Russia's Northern Grouping of Forces, but it is unclear to what degree the Northern Grouping of Forces has authority over these elements' border security functions.
• COA 2: The Russian military command may decide to use the existing Northern Grouping of Forces deployed along the Russian-Ukrainian border to respond to the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast. The Russian Northern Grouping of Forces reportedly had roughly 35,000 personnel deployed to the border area in Kursk, Bryansk, and Belgorod oblasts as of early May 2024 and reportedly intended to establish a grouping in the area that is between 50,000 to 75,000 personnel in size. [19] The Northern Grouping of Forces likely launched the offensive operation into northern Kharkiv Oblast before it reached its reported planned end strength and has since suffered heavy casualties that have likely constrained Russian efforts to build out the grouping. The Russian military command reportedly transferred an unspecified number of forces to the international border area near Kharkiv Oblast in late May and early June 2024, but it was unclear if the Russian military command planned to immediately commit these redeployed forces to combat or use them to reinforce the Northern Grouping of Forces to bring it closer to its reported planned end strength. [20] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on August 8 that the Russian military command began to redeploy forces likely from the 18th Motorized Rifle Division (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and the 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th AC, LMD) from the Belgorod group of the Northern Grouping of Forces operating in the Vovchansk direction northeast of Kharkiv City to the group defending the international border in Kursk Oblast. [21] Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov attempted on August 7 to portray the Northern Grouping of Forces (as well as the FSB) as an effective defensive force, claiming that these forces stopped Ukraine's advances in Kursk Oblast and inflicted significant casualties. [22] The Northern Grouping of Forces has failed to achieve even its limited tactical objectives in northern Kharkiv Oblast since early May 2024 and its ability to conduct effective defensive operations and significant counterattacks is unclear. The redeployment of significant elements of the Northern Grouping of Forces to focus on pushing back Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast would likely further stretch these elements and create vulnerabilities in Russian defenses elsewhere along the border. The Russian military command may also seek to pursue this COA should it deem the Northern Grouping of Forces' offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast to be less of a priority than defensive operations in Kursk Oblast.
• COA 4: The Russian military command may seek to maintain the forces it currently has committed to Kursk Oblast but could redeploy significant aviation and strike elements to the area in an effort to improve Russia's ability to retake territory. Russian aviation currently conducts routine sorties to strike frontline and rear Ukrainian positions throughout the frontline, and the Russian military command may seek to leverage available aviation assets should it determine that the current forces in Kursk Oblast are ill-fitted to retake territory while aiming to avoid redeployments from elsewhere in the theater. The Russian military command may envision that both rotary- and fixed-wing aviation operations at scale in airspace over Kursk Oblast would allow Russian forces to blunt Ukrainian maneuver and prevent Ukrainian forces from securely consolidating positions and thereby allow the current Russian forces deployed in the area to more effectively conduct counterattacks and defensive operations. It is unclear whether the current Russian forces deployed to Kursk Oblast would be able to exploit the effects of large-scale Russian aviation operations over Kursk Oblast, however. It is also unclear if large-scale aviation operations over Kursk Oblast would disrupt Russia's ability to routinely use tactical aviation for glide bomb strikes throughout the frontline. Russian sources have indicated that Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast, including the "mobile groups" operating further into Russian territory, have significant air defense capabilities that would likely make large-scale Russian aviation operations in the area challenging. [26] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are operating rotary-wing aircraft in certain areas of Kursk Oblast, which would suggest that current Russian air defense coverage in the area may be sparse and may facilitate even limited Ukrainian aviation operations that would further complicate the Russian military's ability to field aviation at scale over Kursk Oblast. [27] ISW has not yet observed confirmation of reported Ukrainian air and air defense capabilities in Kursk Oblast. Russian forces could also deploy ground-based strike capabilities at scale to areas in and near Kursk Oblast to constrain Ukrainian advances and disrupt Ukrainian consolidation at positions within Russia, but Russian forces have generally proven incapable of using longer-range strike capabilities to set conditions for the type of ground maneuver needed to quickly retake territory in Kursk Oblast.

The lack of a coherent Russian response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and the reported rate of Ukrainian advance indicates that Ukrainian forces were able to achieve operational surprise along the border with Russia. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces have struggled to achieve operational surprise in the past year and a half of fighting due to the partially transparent battlefield in Ukraine. Ukraine's ability to achieve operational surprise highlights that the widespread visual and sensor-based transparency that both sides have established does not translate into a fully transparent battlefield, however, and that the belligerents in Ukraine can leverage ambiguity around operational intent to achieve operational surprise. One Russian milblogger criticized the Russian military command for failing to observe and react to Ukrainian forces allegedly massing on the border near Kursk Oblast. [28] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continually warned the Russian high command about a massing of Ukrainian forces along the border near Kursk Oblast but that the Russian command failed to adequately prepare for potential Ukrainian offensive operations. [29] Ukrainian forces would have successfully concealed their operational intent in order to achieve operational surprise if milblogger claims that Russian forces observed a buildup of Ukrainian forces in border areas are accurate. ISW has previously assessed that Russian forces have failed to internalize lessons learned about the difficulties of mechanized maneuver on an assumed transparent battlefield in Ukraine. [30] Ukraine, however, appears to be learning and adapting to this aspect of the battlefield given its ability to achieve apparent operational surprise in this instance .

Ukrainian officials have yet to comment directly on Ukraine's ongoing operation into Kursk Oblast. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on August 8 that Russia "brought the war to Ukraine" and must "feel what it has done" in response. [31] Advisor to the Head of the Ukrainian President's Office Mykhaylo Podolyak acknowledged the ongoing "events" in Kursk Oblast and noted that Russia is to blame for the situation, and an unnamed advisor to Zelensky also acknowledged the ongoing Ukrainian military operation into Kursk Oblast during an interview with the Washington Post on August 8. [32]

US officials noted that Ukraine's ongoing operation into Kursk Oblast is not a violation of US restrictions on Ukraine's ability to strike military targets within Russia's border areas. Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh stated during a press briefing on August 8 that Ukraine's operation into Kursk Oblast is consistent with US policy and that the US supports Ukraine's right to defend itself against attacks across the international border. [33] White House Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and State Department Spokesperson Matthew Miller also noted the Biden Administration's support for Ukraine's "common sense" and defensive actions on August 7. [34] Unnamed "US and Ukrainian officials" told CNN on August 8 that Ukrainian forces hope to disrupt and demoralize Russian forces and partially divert Russian forces from frontline areas in eastern Ukraine. [35]

Russian-backed Abkhazian Foreign Minister Sergei Shamba told Kremlin newswire TASS on August 8 that there are no plans to construct a Russian naval base at the Ochamchire port in Russian-controlled Abkhazia, Georgia. [36] Shamba noted that Russian forces have stationed border patrol boats at the port. Shamba stated in January 2024 that Russia was designing a permanent naval base in Abkhazia, however, and Russian-backed Abkhazian President Aslan Bzhania announced in October 2023 that he signed an agreement with Russian authorities to construct the base near Ochamchire. [37] Naval News reported in July 2024 that the Russian Project 22870 support ship, which had been previously docked at its home port in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, arrived at the Ochamchire port. [38] It is unclear why the Russian government would abandon its plans to construct a permanent naval base in Abkhazia, as Ukrainian strikes against Black Sea Fleet assets have largely rendered naval basing in occupied Sevastopol, Crimea useless and have forced Russia to seek a more permanent basing pattern in the eastern Black Sea. [39]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian cross-border mechanized offensive operations into Kursk Oblast that began on August 6 are continuing as part of a Ukrainian operational effort within Russian territory. ISW will not offer assessments about the intent of this Ukrainian operation in order to avoid compromising Ukrainian operational security.
• Geolocated footage and Russian claims indicate that Ukrainian forces continued rapid advances further into Kursk Oblast on August 8, and Ukrainian forces are reportedly present in areas as far as 35 kilometers from the international border with Sumy Oblast. Ukrainian forces most certainly do not control all of the territory within the maximalist extent of Russian claims about Ukrainian advances in Kursk Oblast, however.
• The Kremlin will almost certainly endeavor to retake Russian territory in Kursk Oblast that Ukrainian forces have seized and stop Ukrainian activity further into Russia, as substantial Ukrainian advances within Russia would be a strategic blow to Russian President Vladimir Putin's decades-long effort to cement a legacy of Russian stability, security, and geopolitical resurgence.
• COA (Course of Action) 1: The Russian military command may decide to use existing conscripts, Federal Security Service (FSB) border guards, Rosgvardia, and other irregular forces already deployed to the international border area to push Ukrainian forces back and defend against the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast.
• COA 2: The Russian military command may decide to use the existing Northern Grouping of Forces deployed along the Russian-Ukrainian border to respond to the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk Oblast.
• COA 3: The Russian military command may choose to redeploy operational reserves that it accumulated for its planned Summer 2024 offensive effort and/or relatively better provisioned and more combat effective frontline units to Kursk Oblast from elsewhere in the theater.
• COA 4: The Russian military command may seek to maintain the forces it currently has committed to Kursk Oblast but could redeploy significant aviation and strike elements to the area in an effort to improve Russia's ability to retake territory.
• The lack of a coherent Russian response to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and the reported rate of Ukrainian advance indicates that Ukrainian forces were able to achieve operational surprise along the border with Russia.
• Ukrainian officials have yet to comment directly on Ukraine's ongoing operation into Kursk Oblast.
• US officials noted that Ukraine's ongoing operation into Kursk Oblast is not a violation of US restrictions on Ukraine's ability to strike military targets within Russia's border areas.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. 

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Russian Technological Adaptations
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

• Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast ( Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Tykhe on August 7 and 8, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. [40] The Ukrainian Kharkiv Group of Forces reported on August 8 that Russian forces recently transferred an unspecified unit from occupied Luhansk Oblast to the Vovchansk direction and that Russian forces did not use tactical aviation in the Kharkiv direction on August 8. [41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Hlyboke. [42]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on August 8, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Novoosynove and Kolisnykivka; northwest of Kreminna near Novoserhiivka, Nevske, and Makiivka; west of Kreminna near Terny; and southwest of Kreminna in the Serebryanske forest area on August 7 and 8. [43]

Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov stated on August 8 that Ukrainian forces conducted a HIMARS strike on August 5 against a command post of the Russian 2nd Battalion of the 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) near occupied Bohdanivka, Luhansk Oblast, killing the battalion's commander and several Russian officers. [44] ISW cannot independently confirm this report.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka, Spirne, and Vyimka; and south of Siversk near Pereizne on August 7 and 8. [45] Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Ivano-Darivka and Pereizne. [46]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Chasiv Yar, north of Chasiv Yar near Kalynivka, and east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske on August 7 and 8. [47] Elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division reportedly continue to operate near Chasiv Yar. [48]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Toretsk on August 8, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued to advance within Niu York (south of Toretsk) and that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked in the area. [49] Russian forces also continued offensive operations near Toretsk, east of Toretsk near Pivnichne, and southeast of Toretsk near Zalizne on August 7 and 8. [50] Elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near Niu York. [51]

Russian forces reportedly advanced east of Pokrovsk on August 8, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces operating east of Pokrovsk advanced up to the outskirts of Hrodivka and near Lysychne and Ivanivka. [52] Russian milbloggers also continued to claim that Russian forces seized Serhiivka (southeast of Pokrovsk). [53] ISW has not observed confirmation of these Russian claims, however. Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Pokrovsk near Vozdvyzhenka; east of Pokrovsk near Kalynove, Novooleksandrivka, Ivanivka, and Lysychne; and southeast of Pokrovsk near Zhelanne, Karlivka, and Yasnobrodivka on August 7 and 8. [54]

Russian forces reportedly advanced southwest of Donetsk City on August 8 but did not make confirmed gains in the area. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Vodyane (southwest of Donetsk City), although ISW has not observed confirmation of this claim. [55] Russian forces continued offensive operations west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Kostyantynivka, Paraskoviivka, Vodyane, Volodymyrivka, and Vuhledar on August 7 and 8. [56] Elements of the Russian 163rd Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kurakhove direction (west and southwest of Donetsk City). [57]

Russian forces recently made marginal gains south of Velyka Novosilka in the Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border area, but Russian and Ukrainian sources did not report fighting in the area on August 8. Geolocated footage published on August 8 indicates that Russian forces recently made marginal gains northeast of Urozhaine (south of Velyka Novosilka). [58]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued ground attacks near Robotyne and northeast of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 7 and 8. [59]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks in the Dnipro direction (Kherson Oblast) on August 7 and 8. [60] Elements of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue operating on the islands in the Dnipro River Delta. [61]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian air defense systems shot down a Ukrainian drone over occupied Crimea on August 8. [62]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a limited series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 7 to 8. Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk stated that Russian forces launched two Kh-59 cruise missiles from over the Sea of Azov, two Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Belgorod Oblast, and four Shahed-136/131 drones from Yeysk, Krasnodar Krai and that Ukrainian forces shot down two Kh-59 cruise missiles and four Shahed drones over Odesa, Kherson, and Kirovohrad oblasts. [63]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Kremlin continues efforts to limit violations to Russian military operational security in Ukraine and control the distribution of information about the Russian military to the information space. Russian President Vladimir Putin approved a law on August 8 that makes the use of electronic "gadgets" (personal phones and electronic devices) by Russian military personnel in the combat zone in Ukraine to perform tasks that are not part of their official duties a disciplinary offense punishable by up to 10 days of arrest. [64] The law does not apply to military personnel using electronic "gadgets" to perform their official duties, however. The law also states that military personnel who distribute information about Russian military activities, unit deployments, or servicemembers' families to the media or on the internet face the same punishment. Russian milbloggers previously widely criticized the State Duma proposals allowing for the punishment of servicemembers for using "gadgets" in the combat zone, claiming that this would significantly complicate Russian logistics, command and control, and operations in general, and the final law's permission for Russian personnel to use these devices to perform their official tasks are likely in response to this backlash. [65]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger posted footage on August 8 purportedly showing elements of the Russian 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) using unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) to deliver ammunition and evacuate wounded personnel in frontline areas of eastern Ukraine. [66] The milblogger claimed that acting Moscow Oblast Governor Andrei Vorobyov supported the production of the UGVs and noted that the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) design bureau is testing several UGVs.

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine today.

Nothing significant to report.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Independent Belarusian monitoring group The Belarusian Hajun project reported on August 8 that at least nine Russian Shahed-136/131 drones flew into Belarusian airspace from July 11 to 31. [67] The Hajun project reported that one drone fell in Belarus, that seven flew to Ukrainian airspace, and that it is unclear what happened to one drone. Belarusian forces are reportedly taking measures to protect against Russian drones by flying Su-30SM aircraft in southern Belarus during Russian air strikes against Ukraine and redeploying Belarusian helicopters to the Babruysk Airbase to shorten the flight time to the Ukrainian-Belarusian border to intercept drones.

Belarusian and Russian officials took further steps to increase Belarusian-Russian cooperation through the Union State. Union State Secretary Dmitry Mezentsev and Belarusian Security Council State Secretary Alexander Volfovich met in Minsk on August 8 and discussed the final draft of the Union State's Security Concept, which the Council of Ministers and the Supreme State Council of the Union State will reportedly consider in the near future. [68] Mezentsev and Volfovich reportedly discussed the Supreme State Council of the Union State's programs to improve Belarusian and Russian forces' infrastructure and rear facilities. Belarusian Foreign Minister Maxim Ryzhenkov and Russian Ambassador to Belarus Boris Gryzlov also met on August 8 in Minsk and reportedly discussed preparation for the signing of the Union State's Security Concept. [69] The National Bank of Belarus and Central Bank of Russia signed an agreement on August 7 on cooperation and information exchanges related to the supervision and control of the financial market, implementing aspects of the Treaty of the Establishment of the Union State.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/dva_majors/49120 ; https://t.me/rybar/62567 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74302  ; https://t.me/rusich_army/16342 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/127888 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25888

[2] https://t.me/notes_veterans/18606 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/18628 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25905 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58028 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58026 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25900 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74285  ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/27567 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/127828 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25902 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/16342 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58037 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74302  ; https://t.me/rybar/62567 ; https://t.me/rybar/62546

[3] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/6299?single ; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/1962 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/49143 ; https://t.me/rybar/62561 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/49120  ; https://t.me/mig41/35945 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74283 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74295  ; https://t.me/dva_majors/49096

[4] https://x.com/giK1893/status/1821621690717085870 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/38431 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74252 ; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/9412 ; https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1821345068885647545 ; https://x.com/EjShahid/status/1821311435131027729 ;  ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74302  

[5] https://t.me/z_arhiv/27567 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13548 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/127920 ; https://x.com/ian_matveev/status/1821598298286731687 ; https://x.com/Militarylandnet/status/1821604070735614061 ; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1821597271206805989 ; https://t.me/readovkanews/84455 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/132781

[6] https://t.me/dva_majors/49120 ; https://t.me/rybar/62561 ; https://t.me/rybar/62576 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/127884 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/127830 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25905 ; http://t.me/mig41/35981 ; https://t.me/rybar/62563 ; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/1958 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74296 ; https://t.me/sashakots/48269 ; https://t.me/rybar/62576 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/127884 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74302  

; https://t.me/dva_majors/49075 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/18571 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/127888 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25888 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/49087 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13548 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13589

[7] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58037 ; https://t.me/rybar/62546 ; https://t.me/rybar/62561 ; https://t.me/rybar/62567 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/132710 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/18601 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25904 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/127828 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/132741 ; https://t.me/mig41/35943 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74267 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74272 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/49154 ; https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/38853

[8] https://t.me/rybar/62567 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13527 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/132810

[9] https://t.me/rybar/62580 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/132810

[10] https://t.me/dva_majors/49133 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13578 ; https://t.me/control_sigma/32633; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58052

[11] http://www.kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74725

[12] https://t.me/russianocontext/4252 ; https://t.me/rybar/62581 ; https://t.me/breakingmash/56581 ; https://t.me/rybar/62561 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/127884 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25902 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13571

[13] https://t.me/tass_agency/264864 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/264865; https://t.me/tass_agency/264868 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7-2024

[14] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031824 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031524 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-14-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060523 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060223

[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-15-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-29-2024

[16] https://t.me/rybar/62546 ; ; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/12484 ; https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1821300140755271836 ; https://t.me/vchkogpu/49735 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58023 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/41905 ; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/12484 ; https://t.me/russianocontext/4248 ; https://t.me/mobilizationnews/19726 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/49141 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74281 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/49098 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/49158 ; https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/38851

[17] https://t.me/motopatriot/25903 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25902

[18] https://t.me/motopatriot/25902 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-25-2024

[19] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-11-2024

[20] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060824

[21] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2101

[22] https://isw.pub/UkrWar08072024

[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032224 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-14-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031324

[24] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062024 ; https://isw.pub/IranUpdate080122 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060824

[25] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58025

[26] https://t.me/dva_majors/49083 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13542 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13537

[27] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58056 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58053

[28] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/16803

[29] https://t.me/rybar/62558 ; https://t.me/vysokygovorit/16803

[30] https://isw.pub/UkrWar073024

[31] https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/rosiya-prinesla-vijnu-na-nashu-zemlyu-j-povinna-vidchuvati-s-92549

[32] https://t.me/M_Podolyak/273 ; https://t.me/M_Podolyak/274 ; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/08/08/ukraine-kursk-russia-occupied-war/

[33] https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3867296/deputy-pentagon-press-secretary-sabrina-singh-holds-a-press-conference/

[34] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2024/08/07/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-karine-jean-pierre-66/ ; https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-august-7-2024/

[35] https://www.cnn.com/2024/08/08/europe/russia-ukrainian-incursion-intl/index.html

[36] https://t.me/tass_agency/265131  

[37] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/6452529 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5-2023

[38] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2024

[39] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukrainian-strikes-have-changed-russian-naval-operations-black-sea

[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03zipYjkoquPgE64diY6wjN869ipSQVEwMC15DSpTXzu2UFvJ5z2ZRLRMHoQWg7C4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KZ89CAEPXg2Wwk1WxVvwKtsa6pxp7dcRCrNos1xUYuYbjRFrhy2YhTp752Y8Vc14l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02svE7QNyaWXNLksSMMjEXgLAXZEEXNVQt1cSYEd9mwk1dq9LZ85FA9TtqrGoshbZHl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21452 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13524  

[41] https://t.me/otukharkiv/670 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/08/08/vijska-rf-ne-vidhodyat-z-harkivshhyny-popry-boyi-u-kurskij-oblasti/

[42] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13524  

[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03zipYjkoquPgE64diY6wjN869ipSQVEwMC15DSpTXzu2UFvJ5z2ZRLRMHoQWg7C4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KZ89CAEPXg2Wwk1WxVvwKtsa6pxp7dcRCrNos1xUYuYbjRFrhy2YhTp752Y8Vc14l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02svE7QNyaWXNLksSMMjEXgLAXZEEXNVQt1cSYEd9mwk1dq9LZ85FA9TtqrGoshbZHl

[44] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/12504 ; https://t.me/pechalbeda200/101483

[45] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03zipYjkoquPgE64diY6wjN869ipSQVEwMC15DSpTXzu2UFvJ5z2ZRLRMHoQWg7C4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KZ89CAEPXg2Wwk1WxVvwKtsa6pxp7dcRCrNos1xUYuYbjRFrhy2YhTp752Y8Vc14l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02svE7QNyaWXNLksSMMjEXgLAXZEEXNVQt1cSYEd9mwk1dq9LZ85FA9TtqrGoshbZHl

[46] https://t.me/rusich_army/16341

[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03zipYjkoquPgE64diY6wjN869ipSQVEwMC15DSpTXzu2UFvJ5z2ZRLRMHoQWg7C4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KZ89CAEPXg2Wwk1WxVvwKtsa6pxp7dcRCrNos1xUYuYbjRFrhy2YhTp752Y8Vc14l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02svE7QNyaWXNLksSMMjEXgLAXZEEXNVQt1cSYEd9mwk1dq9LZ85FA9TtqrGoshbZHl

[48] https://t.me/mod_russia/41903

[49] https://t.me/wargonzo/21452 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/13564 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25879

[50] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03zipYjkoquPgE64diY6wjN869ipSQVEwMC15DSpTXzu2UFvJ5z2ZRLRMHoQWg7C4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KZ89CAEPXg2Wwk1WxVvwKtsa6pxp7dcRCrNos1xUYuYbjRFrhy2YhTp752Y8Vc14l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02svE7QNyaWXNLksSMMjEXgLAXZEEXNVQt1cSYEd9mwk1dq9LZ85FA9TtqrGoshbZHl ;

[51] https://t.me/wargonzo/21459

[52] https://t.me/motopatriot/25873 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25874 ; https://t.me/rybar/62568

[53] https://t.me/rybar/62568  ; https://t.me/motopatriot/25878 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74303  ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/132772 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21452

[54] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03zipYjkoquPgE64diY6wjN869ipSQVEwMC15DSpTXzu2UFvJ5z2ZRLRMHoQWg7C4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KZ89CAEPXg2Wwk1WxVvwKtsa6pxp7dcRCrNos1xUYuYbjRFrhy2YhTp752Y8Vc14l  ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02svE7QNyaWXNLksSMMjEXgLAXZEEXNVQt1cSYEd9mwk1dq9LZ85FA9TtqrGoshbZHl ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74246 ; https://t.me/rybar/62568 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21452 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/132717

[55] https://t.me/z_arhiv/27564 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/132772

[56] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03zipYjkoquPgE64diY6wjN869ipSQVEwMC15DSpTXzu2UFvJ5z2ZRLRMHoQWg7C4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KZ89CAEPXg2Wwk1WxVvwKtsa6pxp7dcRCrNos1xUYuYbjRFrhy2YhTp752Y8Vc14l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02svE7QNyaWXNLksSMMjEXgLAXZEEXNVQt1cSYEd9mwk1dq9LZ85FA9TtqrGoshbZHl

[57] https://t.me/dva_majors/49060

[58] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/18220; https://t.me/ukraine20obsp/770

[59] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid03zipYjkoquPgE64diY6wjN869ipSQVEwMC15DSpTXzu2UFvJ5z2ZRLRMHoQWg7C4l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KZ89CAEPXg2Wwk1WxVvwKtsa6pxp7dcRCrNos1xUYuYbjRFrhy2YhTp752Y8Vc14l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02svE7QNyaWXNLksSMMjEXgLAXZEEXNVQt1cSYEd9mwk1dq9LZ85FA9TtqrGoshbZHl ; https://t.me/wargonzo/21452

[60] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02KZ89CAEPXg2Wwk1WxVvwKtsa6pxp7dcRCrNos1xUYuYbjRFrhy2YhTp752Y8Vc14l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02svE7QNyaWXNLksSMMjEXgLAXZEEXNVQt1cSYEd9mwk1dq9LZ85FA9TtqrGoshbZHl ;

[61] https://t.me/wargonzo/21467

[62] https://t.me/mod_russia/41921

[63] https://t.me/ComAFUA/377

[64] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/21561113; http://publication dot pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202408080028

[65] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072324

[66] https://t.me/rybar/62562

[67] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/8032

[68] https://www.belta dot by/society/view/zavershena-sovmestnaja-rabota-nad-proektom-kontseptsii-bezopasnosti-sojuznogo-gosudarstva-652996-2024/

[69] https://www.belta dot by/society/view/ryzhenkov-i-gryzlov-obsudili-podgotovku-proekta-belorussko-rossijskogo-dogovora-o-garantijah-653049-2024/; https://t.me/MID_Russia/43980