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The “Right to Travel”

By: Rob Natelson | Published on: May 14, 2020 | Categories: 14th Amendment , Constitution , Privileges and Immunities Clause

During the COVID-19 epidemic, state and local governments have restricted greatly the freedom of citizens to travel from one place to another. As I have  pointed out , many of these restrictions violate modern constitutional law.  The Supreme Court characterizes the right to travel as  fundamental . That means that even infringements imposed for “compelling governmental purposes” must be “narrowly tailored.” Government COVID restrictions frequently are over-broad or otherwise not adequately targeted at the problem they purport to address.

The Supreme Court cases enunciating a right to travel involve movement from state to state. The cases arose when a person moved from State X to State Y and State Y discriminated against him or her in some way. The Court invalidates the discrimination by saying that State Y violated the person’s right to travel.

If there is a constitutionally-recognized right to travel among states, then  a fortiori  it includes a right to travel within one’s own state. After all, you can’t get to another state without moving first within your own. Moreover, moving locally seems to be an even more basic right than moving elsewhere. Not surprisingly, in 2002 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit  ruled that  the right to travel includes in-state movement.

Most people would recognize “freedom of locomotion” as an inherent, natural right of free people. But, of course, not every natural right is given specific protection by the Constitution. There is no specifically constitutional right to eat Chinese food or wear the hat of one’s choice. Nor does the Constitution mention a right to travel. So is it a  constitutional  as well as a  natural  right? I think the honest answer is “no.”

The Constitution was never designed to be a document to cure every human problem. But many writers seem to think it has to be, and they have struggled to find the right to travel among its provisions.

For example, some claim the right derives from the  Privileges and Immunities Clause  of Article IV. That provision bans certain kinds of discrimination by states against outsiders. It does not apply to the federal government.

However,  copious evidence —which commentators have largely ignored—tells us that when the Constitution was adopted, the terms “privileges” and “immunities” did not refer to natural rights such as freedom of locomotion. Rather, they were technical legal terms that represented alternative ways of referring to  entitlements  created by civil government. Notable privileges and immunities included formal procedures for transferring property, access to state courts, trial by jury, and the writ of habeas corpus (which the Constitution specifically calls a “privilege”). The Constitution’s Privileges or Immunities Clause focused on entitlements rather than natural rights.

Commentators frequently cite a statement by a single Supreme Court justice suggesting that the Privileges and Immunities Clause did include natural rights. But that statement was not relevant to the issues in the case under decision, and it was not issued by the full court. And the case in which it appeared,  Corfield v. Coryell  (1823), was decided more than three decades  after  the Constitution was ratified. Moreover, if you read the statement thoughtfully, you see that it is  so obviously inaccurate  you can’t rely on it without abandoning your critical faculties.

There is also this important fact: The Articles of Confederation included a right to travel immediately after its privileges and immunities clause. But  the framers of the Constitution removed it!  Here is the language of the Articles:

“The . . . the free inhabitants of each of these States . . . shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States; and the people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions, and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively . . .”

Here is the language in the Constitution:

“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”

An obvious reason the Constitution’s framers dropped the right to travel was that the Constitution, unlike the Articles, granted Congress authority over interstate trade. The Federal Congress would be able to eliminate state barriers to free movement in ways the Confederation Congress could not.

Can a right to travel be found in other parts of the Constitution? Some commentators cite the Due Process Clause of the 5th amendment (which applies to the federal government) and the Due Process Cause of the 14th amendment (which applies to the states).

The phrase “due process of law” was a 1354 re-formulation of the “law of the land” clause in Magna Carta (1215). Its sole purpose was to stop arbitrary government legal proceedings. Despite the Supreme Court’s lame efforts to read substantive rights into “due process,” historically the phrase means only this: When the government proceeds against you criminally or civilly it must follow established procedures and not make up the rules as it goes along. In other words, the due process clauses are really just  protections against unfair government retroactivity.

Another possible source of the right to travel is the  Equal Protection Clause  of the 14th amendment. This is better grounded: The “State X/StateY” hypothetical case above really is an Equal Protection Clause case. It makes sense to apply the Equal Protection Clause to prevent states from discriminating senselessly against their newer citizens. But granting such protection is not the same as creating a self-contained “right to travel.” It also does nothing to protect the right against the federal government.

Finally, there are those who argue that travel is a “privilege or immunity” of “citizens of the United States,” thereby protected by the  Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 14th amendment .

Constitutional commentators of all political stripes love the idea of using the Privileges or Immunities Clause to prevent the states from treading on favorite constitutional rights. (Many libertarians support the concept, oblivious to the fact that the more broadly you read the Privileges or Immunities Clause the more powerful Congress becomes, because of the enforcement rule in Section 5 of the 14th amendment.)

Those commentators have struggled mightily to show that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects natural rights. They loathe the 1873  Supreme Court opinion , subscribed to by justices with personal knowledge of the framing and ratification of the 14th amendment, that interpreted the Clause more narrowly.

The flood of words purporting to prove that “privileges or immunities” includes “natural rights” masks the weaknesses of the case. You don’t have to navigate far into that flood to spy some of those weaknesses: One commentator says “privileges or immunities” comprise only the content of the Bill of Rights. Another says they include unenumerated rights. For one commentator “the privileges or immunities of citizens” include property rights. For another, they include abortion. For yet another, they encompass both—or neither.  Additionally, the commentators produce little evidence about the views of the ultimate authorities: the ratifying state legislatures. Instead they discuss what one or two members of Congress said, or a remark made years after the amendment was ratified, or the gibberish from  Corfield v. Coryell .

Now, as we have seen, in the original Constitution the terms “privileges” and “immunities” mean entitlements. Without strong evidence to the contrary, it makes sense to apply the same meaning in the 14th amendment because:

• When the same word (and here, almost the same phrase) appears several times in a document, it is presumed to mean the same thing,
• the state legislatures that ratified the 14th amendment were familiar with that presumption, and
• that interpretation serves what everyone admits was the core purpose of the 14th amendment: to protect entitlements created by federal law—such as equal access to public institutions and accommodations—against state interference.

Now, let me be clear: I would love for there to be a constitutional right to travel. But honesty compels me to admit that the one the courts apply is probably a judicial fiction.

The  Constitution does not always agree with me.  Nor are my personal preferences always constitutional law.

Tags: 14th Amendment , Corfield v Coryell , Privileges and Immunities , Right to Travel

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Shapiro v Thompson Established 14th Amendment Right to Travel

In Shapiro v Thompson , 394 U.S. 618 (1969), the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right to travel from one state to another. It further held that state laws that imposed residency requirements to obtain welfare assistance violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment .

Facts of Shapiro v Thompson

The Connecticut Welfare Department denied Vivian Marie Thompson’s application for assistance under the program for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). She was a 19-year-old unwed mother of one child and pregnant with her second child when she changed her residence in June, 1966, from Dorchester, Massachusetts, to Hartford, Connecticut, to live with her mother, a Hartford resident. She moved to her own apartment in Hartford several months later. Because of her pregnancy, she was unable to work or enter a work training program.

Thompson’s application was denied pursuant to Connecticut statutory provisions that denied welfare assistance to persons who were residents and met all other eligibility requirements except that they had not resided within the jurisdiction for at least a year immediately preceding their applications for assistance. Thompson subsequently filed suit, arguing that prohibition of benefits to residents of less than one year created a discriminatory classification that denies them equal protection of the laws.

The majority of a three-member panel of the Connecticut District Court held that the provision was unconstitutional because it “has a chilling effect on the right to travel.”  The majority further held that the provision was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the denial of relief to those residents in the State for less than a year is not based on any permissible purpose, but is solely designed “to protect its fisc by discouraging entry of those who come needing relief.”

The consolidated cases before the Supreme Court also challenged the constitutionality of Pennsylvania and District of Columbia statutory provisions that also denied welfare assistance to persons who were residents and meet all other eligibility requirements except that they have not resided within the jurisdiction for at least a year immediately preceding their applications for assistance. The states argued that the waiting period was needed to preserve the fiscal integrity of their public assistance programs, as persons who require welfare assistance during their first year of residence are likely to become continuing burdens on welfare programs. They also sought to justify the classification as a permissible attempt to discourage indigents from entering a State solely to obtain larger benefits and to distinguish between new and old residents on the basis of the tax contributions they have made to the community. The states also cited administrative and related governmental objectives, such as facilitating the planning of welfare budgets, providing an objective test of residency, minimizing the opportunity for recipients fraudulently to receive payments from more than one jurisdiction, and encouraging the early entry of new residents into the labor force.

Court’s Decision in Shapiro v Thompson

By vote 6-3, the Supreme Court held that residency requirements of the AFDC aid program violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause . William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote on behalf of the majority.

The majority first addressed the right to travel. “Since the Constitution guarantees the right of interstate movement, the purpose of deterring the migration of indigents into a State is impermissible, and cannot serve to justify the classification created by the one-year waiting period,” Justice Brennan wrote.

Since the state laws at issue involved the “fundamental right of interstate movement,” the majority determined that they must promote a compelling state interest. “In moving from jurisdiction to jurisdiction appellees were exercising a constitutional right, and any classification which penalizes the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a  compelling  governmental interest, is unconstitutional,” Justice Brennan explained.

Applying this standard, the majority concluded that the regulations failed to pass muster and, therefore, violated the Equal Protection Clause. “A State may no more try to fence out those indigents who seek higher welfare payments than it may try to fence out indigents generally,” Justice Brenna wrote.

He added: “The classification may not be sustained as an attempt to distinguish between new and old residents on the basis of the contribution they have made to the community through the payment of taxes because the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the States from apportioning benefits or services on the basis of the past tax contributions of its citizens.

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The Right to Travel

The doctrine of the "right to travel" actually encompasses three separate rights, of which two have been notable for the uncertainty of their textual support. The first is the right of a citizen to move freely between states, a right venerable for its longevity, but still lacking a clear doctrinal basis. 1858 The second, expressly addressed by the first sentence of Article IV, provides a citizen of one State who is temporarily visiting another state the "Privileges and Immunities" of a citizen of the latter state. 1859 The third is the right of a new arrival to a state, who establishes citizenship in that state, to enjoy the same rights and benefits as other state citizens. This right is most often invoked in challenges to durational residency requirements, which require that persons reside in a state for a specified period of time before taking advantage of the benefits of that state's citizenship.

1858 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999). "For the purposes of this case, we need not identify the source of [the right to travel] in the text of the Constitution. The right of free ingress and regress to and from' neighboring states which was expressly mentioned in the text of the Article of Confederation, may simply have been conceived from the beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created."' Id. at 501 (citations omitted).

1859 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868) ("without some provision . . . removing from citizens of each State the disabilities of alienage in other States, and giving them equality of privilege with citizens of those States, the Republic would have constituted little more than a league of States; it would not have constituted the Union which now exists.").

Durational Residency Requirements .—Challenges to durational residency requirements have traditionally been made under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1999, however, a majority of the Supreme Court approved a doctrinal shift, so that state laws which distinguished between their own citizens based on how long they had been in the state would be evaluated instead under the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 1860 The Court did not, however, question the continuing efficacy of the earlier cases.

A durational residency requirement creates two classes of persons: those who have been within the State for the prescribed period and those who have not been. 1861 But persons who have moved recently, at least from State to State, 1862 have exercised a right protected by the Constitution of the United States, and the durational residency classification either deters the exercise of the right or penalizes those who have exercised the right. 1863 Any such classification is invalid "unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest ." 1864 The constitutional right to travel has long been recognized, 1865 but it is only relatively recently that the strict standard of equal protection review has been applied to nullify those durational residency provisions which have been brought before the Court.

1860 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502-03 (1999).

1861 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 334 (1972). Inasmuch as the right to travel is implicated by state distinctions between residents and nonresidents, the relevant constitutional provision is the privileges and immunities clause, Article IV, § 2, cl. 1.

1862 Intrastate travel is protected to the extent that the classification fails to meet equal protection standards in some respect. Compare Hadnott v. Amos, 320 F. Supp. 107 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (three-judge court), aff'd. per curiam , 405 U.S. 1035 (1972), with Arlington County Bd. v. Richards, 434 U.S. 5 (1977). The same principle applies in the commerce clause cases, in which discrimination may run against in-state as well as out-of-state concerns. Cf. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).

1863 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31, 638 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338-42 (1972); Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 420-21 (1981). See also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 236-39 (1970) (Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall), and id. at 285-92 (Justices Stewart and Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger).

1864 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (emphasis by Court); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1971).

1865 Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (both cases in context of direct restrictions on travel). The source of the right to travel and the reasons for reliance on the equal protection clause are questions puzzled over and unresolved by the Court. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758, 759 (1966), and id. at 763-64 (Justice Harlan concurring and dissenting), id. at 777 n.3 (Justice Brennan concurring and dissenting); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969), and id. at 671 (Justice Harlan dissenting); San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1973); Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 417-19 (1981); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60 & n.6 (1982), and id. at 66-68 (Justice Brennan concurring), 78-81 (Justice O'Connor concurring).

Thus, in Shapiro v. Thompson , 1866 durational residency requirements conditioning eligibility for welfare assistance on one year's residence in the State 1867 were voided. If the purpose of the requirements was to inhibit migration by needy persons into the State or to bar the entry of those who came from low-paying States to higher-paying ones in order to collect greater benefits, the Court said, the purpose was impermissible. 1868 If on the other hand the purpose was to serve certain administrative and related governmental objectives—the facilitation of the planning of budgets, the provision of an objective test of residency, minimization of opportunity for fraud, and encouragement of early entry of new residents into the labor force—the requirements were rationally related to the purpose but they were not compelling enough to justify a classification which infringed on a fundamental interest. 1869 Similarly, in Dunn v. Blumstein , 1870 where the durational residency requirements denied the franchise to newcomers, the assertion of such administrative justifications was constitutionally insufficient to justify the classification. The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was the basis for striking down a California law which limited welfare benefits for California citizens who had resided in the state for less than a year to the level ifof benefits which they would have received in the State of their prior residence. 1871

1866 394 U.S. 618 (1969).

1867 The durational residency provision established by Congress for the District of Columbia was also voided. 394 U.S. at 641-42.

1868 394 U.S. at 627-33. Gaddis v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 717 (N.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd sub nom. Wyman v. Bowens, 397 U.S. 49 (1970), struck down a provision construed so as to bar only persons who came into the State solely to obtain welfare assistance.

1869 394 U.S. at 633-38. Shapiro was reaffirmed in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (striking down durational residency requirements for aliens applying for welfare assistance), and in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (voiding requirement of one year's residency in county as condition to indigent's receiving nonemergency hospitalization or medical care at county's expense). When Connecticut and New York reinstituted the requirements, pleading a financial emergency as the compelling state interest, they were summarily rebuffed. Rivera v. Dunn, 329 F. Supp. 554 (D. Conn. 1971), aff'd per curiam , 404 U.S. 1054 (1972); Lopez v. Wyman, Civ. No. 1971-308 (W.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd per curiam , 404 U.S. 1055 (1972). The source of the funds, state or federal, is irrelevant to application of the principle. Pease v. Hansen, 404 U.S. 70 (1971).

1870 405 U.S. 330 (1972). But see Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973), and Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973). Durational residency requirements of five and seven years respectively for candidates for elective office were sustained in Kanapaux v. Ellisor, 419 U.S. 891 (1974), and Sununu v. Stark, 420 U.S. 958 (1975).

1871 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 505 (1999).

However, a state one-year durational residency requirement for the initiation of a divorce proceeding was sustained in Sosna v. Iowa . 1872 While it is not clear what the precise basis of the ruling is, it appears that the Court found that the State's interest in requiring that those who seek a divorce from its courts be genuinely attached to the State and its desire to insulate divorce decrees from the likelihood of collateral attack justified the requirement. 1873 Similarly, durational residency requirements for lower in-state tuition at public colleges have been held constitutionally justifiable, again, however, without a clear statement of reason. 1874 More recently, the Court has attempted to clarify these cases by distinguishing situations where a state citizen is likely to "consume" benefits within a state's borders (such as the provision of welfare) from those where citizens of other states are likely to establish residency just long enough to acquire some portable benefit, and then return to their original domicile to enjoy them (such as obtaining a divorce decree or paying the in-state tuition rate for a college education). 1875

A state scheme for returning to its residents a portion of the income earned from the vast oil deposits discovered within Alaska foundered upon the formula for allocating the dividends; that is, each adult resident received one unit of return for each year of residency subsequent to 1959, the first year of Alaska's statehood. The law thus created fixed, permanent distinctions between an ever-increasing number of classes of bona fide residents based on how long they had been in the State. The differences between the durational residency cases previously decided did not alter the bearing of the right to travel principle upon the distribution scheme, but the Court's decision went off on the absence of any permissible purpose underlying the apportionment classification and it thus failed even the rational basis test. 1876

1872 419 U.S. 393 (1975). Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented on the merits. Id. at 418.

1873 419 U.S. at 409. But the Court also indicated that the plaintiff was not absolutely barred from the state courts, but merely required to wait for access (which was true in the prior cases as well and there held immaterial), and that possibly the state interests in marriage and divorce were more exclusive and thus more immune from federal constitutional attack than were the matters at issue in the previous cases. The Court also did not indicate whether it was using strict or traditional scrutiny.

1874 Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D.Minn. 1970), aff'd per curiam , 401 U.S. 985 (1971). Cf. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 & n.9 (1973), and id. at 456, 464, 467 (dicta). In Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 256 (1974), the Court, noting the results, stated that "some waiting periods . . . may not be penalties" and thus would be valid.

1875 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. at 505 (1999).

1876 Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982). Somewhat similar was the Court's invalidation on equal protection grounds of a veterans preference for state employment limited to persons who were state residents when they entered military service; four Justices also thought the preference penalized the right to travel. Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986).

Unresolved still are issues such as durational residency requirements for occupational licenses and other purposes. 1877 Too, it should be noted that this line of cases does not apply to state residency requirements themselves, as distinguished from durational provisions, 1878 and the cases do not inhibit the States when, having reasons for doing so, they bar travel by certain persons. 1879

1877 La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S. 465 (1919), upholding a two-year residence requirement to become an insurance broker, must be considered of questionable validity. Durational periods for admission to the practice of law or medicine or other professions have evoked differing responses by lower courts.

1878 E.g. , McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645 (1976) (ordinance requiring city employees to be and to remain city residents upheld). See Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 255 (1974). See also Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983) (bona fide residency requirement for free tuition to public schools).

1879 Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412 (1981) (statute made it a misdemeanor to abandon a dependent child but a felony to commit the offense and then leave the State).

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U.S. Supreme Court Says No License Necessary To Drive Automobile On Public Roads

Posted by Jeffrey Phillips | Jul 21, 2015 |

U.S. SUPREME COURT AND OTHER HIGH COURT CITATIONS PROVING THAT NO LICENSE IS NECESSARY FOR NORMAL USE OF AN AUTOMOBILE ON COMMON WAYS

“The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, by horsedrawn carriage, wagon, or automobile, is not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will, but a common right which he has under his right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Under this constitutional guaranty one may, therefore, under normal conditions, travel at his inclination along the public highways or in public places, and while conducting himself in an orderly and decent manner, neither interfering with nor disturbing another’s rights, he will be protected, not only in his person, but in his safe conduct.”

Thompson v.Smith, 154 SE 579, 11 American Jurisprudence, Constitutional Law, section 329, page 1135 “The right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, in the ordinary course of life and business, is a common right which he has under the right to enjoy life and liberty, to acquire and possess property, and to pursue happiness and safety. It includes the right, in so doing, to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day, and under the existing modes of travel, includes the right to drive a horse drawn carriage or wagon thereon or to operate an automobile thereon, for the usual and ordinary purpose of life and business.” –

Thompson vs. Smith, supra.; Teche Lines vs. Danforth, Miss., 12 S.2d 784 “… the right of the citizen to drive on a public street with freedom from police interference… is a fundamental constitutional right” -White, 97 Cal.App.3d.141, 158 Cal.Rptr. 562, 566-67 (1979) “citizens have a right to drive upon the public streets of the District of Columbia or any other city absent a constitutionally sound reason for limiting their access.”

Caneisha Mills v. D.C. 2009 “The use of the automobile as a necessary adjunct to the earning of a livelihood in modern life requires us in the interest of realism to conclude that the RIGHT to use an automobile on the public highways partakes of the nature of a liberty within the meaning of the Constitutional guarantees. . .”

Berberian v. Lussier (1958) 139 A2d 869, 872, See also: Schecter v. Killingsworth, 380 P.2d 136, 140; 93 Ariz. 273 (1963). “The right to operate a motor vehicle [an automobile] upon the public streets and highways is not a mere privilege. It is a right of liberty, the enjoyment of which is protected by the guarantees of the federal and state constitutions.”

Adams v. City of Pocatello, 416 P.2d 46, 48; 91 Idaho 99 (1966). “A traveler has an equal right to employ an automobile as a means of transportation and to occupy the public highways with other vehicles in common use.”

Campbell v. Walker, 78 Atl. 601, 603, 2 Boyce (Del.) 41. “The owner of an automobile has the same right as the owner of other vehicles to use the highway,* * * A traveler on foot has the same right to the use of the public highways as an automobile or any other vehicle.”

Simeone v. Lindsay, 65 Atl. 778, 779; Hannigan v. Wright, 63 Atl. 234, 236. “The RIGHT of the citizen to DRIVE on the public street with freedom from police interference, unless he is engaged in suspicious conduct associated in some manner with criminality is a FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT which must be protected by the courts.” People v. Horton 14 Cal. App. 3rd 667 (1971) “The right to make use of an automobile as a vehicle of travel long the highways of the state, is no longer an open question. The owners thereof have the same rights in the roads and streets as the drivers of horses or those riding a bicycle or traveling in some other vehicle.”

House v. Cramer, 112 N.W. 3; 134 Iowa 374; Farnsworth v. Tampa Electric Co. 57 So. 233, 237, 62 Fla. 166. “The automobile may be used with safety to others users of the highway, and in its proper use upon the highways there is an equal right with the users of other vehicles properly upon the highways. The law recognizes such right of use upon general principles.

Brinkman v Pacholike, 84 N.E. 762, 764, 41 Ind. App. 662, 666. “The law does not denounce motor carriages, as such, on public ways. They have an equal right with other vehicles in common use to occupy the streets and roads. It is improper to say that the driver of the horse has rights in the roads superior to the driver of the automobile. Both have the right to use the easement.”

Indiana Springs Co. v. Brown, 165 Ind. 465, 468. U.S. Supreme Court says No License Necessary To Drive Automobile On Public Highways/Streets No License Is Necessary Copy and Share Freely YHVH.name 2 2 “A highway is a public way open and free to any one who has occasion to pass along it on foot or with any kind of vehicle.” Schlesinger v. City of Atlanta, 129 S.E. 861, 867, 161 Ga. 148, 159;

Holland v. Shackelford, 137 S.E. 2d 298, 304, 220 Ga. 104; Stavola v. Palmer, 73 A.2d 831, 838, 136 Conn. 670 “There can be no question of the right of automobile owners to occupy and use the public streets of cities, or highways in the rural districts.” Liebrecht v. Crandall, 126 N.W. 69, 110 Minn. 454, 456 “The word ‘automobile’ connotes a pleasure vehicle designed for the transportation of persons on highways.”

-American Mutual Liability Ins. Co., vs. Chaput, 60 A.2d 118, 120; 95 NH 200 Motor Vehicle: 18 USC Part 1 Chapter 2 section 31 definitions: “(6) Motor vehicle. – The term “motor vehicle” means every description of carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes on the highways…” 10) The term “used for commercial purposes” means the carriage of persons or property for any fare, fee, rate, charge or other consideration, or directly or indirectly in connection with any business, or other undertaking intended for profit. “A motor vehicle or automobile for hire is a motor vehicle, other than an automobile stage, used for the transportation of persons for which remuneration is received.”

-International Motor Transit Co. vs. Seattle, 251 P. 120 The term ‘motor vehicle’ is different and broader than the word ‘automobile.’”

-City of Dayton vs. DeBrosse, 23 NE.2d 647, 650; 62 Ohio App. 232 “Thus self-driven vehicles are classified according to the use to which they are put rather than according to the means by which they are propelled” – Ex Parte Hoffert, 148 NW 20 ”

The Supreme Court, in Arthur v. Morgan, 112 U.S. 495, 5 S.Ct. 241, 28 L.Ed. 825, held that carriages were properly classified as household effects, and we see no reason that automobiles should not be similarly disposed of.”

Hillhouse v United States, 152 F. 163, 164 (2nd Cir. 1907). “…a citizen has the right to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon…” State vs. Johnson, 243 P. 1073; Cummins vs. Homes, 155 P. 171; Packard vs. Banton, 44 S.Ct. 256; Hadfield vs. Lundin, 98 Wash 516, Willis vs. Buck, 263 P. l 982;

Barney vs. Board of Railroad Commissioners, 17 P.2d 82 “The use of the highways for the purpose of travel and transportation is not a mere privilege, but a common and fundamental Right of which the public and the individual cannot be rightfully deprived.”

Chicago Motor Coach vs. Chicago, 169 NE 22; Ligare vs. Chicago, 28 NE 934; Boon vs. Clark, 214 SSW 607; 25 Am.Jur. (1st) Highways Sect.163 “the right of the Citizen to travel upon the highway and to transport his property thereon in the ordinary course of life and business… is the usual and ordinary right of the Citizen, a right common to all.” –

Ex Parte Dickey, (Dickey vs. Davis), 85 SE 781 “Every Citizen has an unalienable RIGHT to make use of the public highways of the state; every Citizen has full freedom to travel from place to place in the enjoyment of life and liberty.” People v. Nothaus, 147 Colo. 210. “No State government entity has the power to allow or deny passage on the highways, byways, nor waterways… transporting his vehicles and personal property for either recreation or business, but by being subject only to local regulation i.e., safety, caution, traffic lights, speed limits, etc. Travel is not a privilege requiring licensing, vehicle registration, or forced insurances.”

Chicago Coach Co. v. City of Chicago, 337 Ill. 200, 169 N.E. 22. “Traffic infractions are not a crime.” People v. Battle “Persons faced with an unconstitutional licensing law which purports to require a license as a prerequisite to exercise of right… may ignore the law and engage with impunity in exercise of such right.”

Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham 394 U.S. 147 (1969). U.S. Supreme Court says No License Necessary To Drive Automobile On Public Highways/Streets No License Is Necessary Copy and Share Freely YHVH.name 3 “The word ‘operator’ shall not include any person who solely transports his own property and who transports no persons or property for hire or compensation.”

Statutes at Large California Chapter 412 p.83 “Highways are for the use of the traveling public, and all have the right to use them in a reasonable and proper manner; the use thereof is an inalienable right of every citizen.” Escobedo v. State 35 C2d 870 in 8 Cal Jur 3d p.27 “RIGHT — A legal RIGHT, a constitutional RIGHT means a RIGHT protected by the law, by the constitution, but government does not create the idea of RIGHT or original RIGHTS; it acknowledges them. . . “ Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 1914, p. 2961. “Those who have the right to do something cannot be licensed for what they already have right to do as such license would be meaningless.”

City of Chicago v Collins 51 NE 907, 910. “A license means leave to do a thing which the licensor could prevent.” Blatz Brewing Co. v. Collins, 160 P.2d 37, 39; 69 Cal. A. 2d 639. “The object of a license is to confer a right or power, which does not exist without it.”

Payne v. Massey (19__) 196 SW 2nd 493, 145 Tex 273. “The court makes it clear that a license relates to qualifications to engage in profession, business, trade or calling; thus, when merely traveling without compensation or profit, outside of business enterprise or adventure with the corporate state, no license is required of the natural individual traveling for personal business, pleasure and transportation.”

Wingfield v. Fielder 2d Ca. 3d 213 (1972). “If [state] officials construe a vague statute unconstitutionally, the citizen may take them at their word, and act on the assumption that the statute is void.” –

Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham 394 U.S. 147 (1969). “With regard particularly to the U.S. Constitution, it is elementary that a Right secured or protected by that document cannot be overthrown or impaired by any state police authority.” Donnolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 US 540; Lafarier vs. Grand Trunk R.R. Co., 24 A. 848; O’Neil vs. Providence Amusement Co., 108 A. 887. “The right to travel (called the right of free ingress to other states, and egress from them) is so fundamental that it appears in the Articles of Confederation, which governed our society before the Constitution.”

(Paul v. Virginia). “[T]he right to travel freely from State to State … is a right broadly assertable against private interference as well as governmental action. Like the right of association, it is a virtually unconditional personal right, guaranteed by the Constitution to us all.” (U.S. Supreme Court,

Shapiro v. Thompson). EDGERTON, Chief Judge: “Iron curtains have no place in a free world. …’Undoubtedly the right of locomotion, the right to remove from one place to another according to inclination, is an attribute of personal liberty, and the right, ordinarily, of free transit from or through the territory of any State is a right secured by the Constitution.’

Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274, 21 S.Ct. 128, 45 L.Ed. 186. “Our nation has thrived on the principle that, outside areas of plainly harmful conduct, every American is left to shape his own life as he thinks best, do what he pleases, go where he pleases.” Id., at 197.

Kent vs. Dulles see Vestal, Freedom of Movement, 41 Iowa L.Rev. 6, 13—14. “The validity of restrictions on the freedom of movement of particular individuals, both substantively and procedurally, is precisely the sort of matter that is the peculiar domain of the courts.” Comment, 61 Yale L.J. at page 187. “a person detained for an investigatory stop can be questioned but is “not obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest.”Justice White, Hiibel “Automobiles have the right to use the highways of the State on an equal footing with other vehicles.”

Cumberland Telephone. & Telegraph Co. v Yeiser 141 Kentucy 15. “Each citizen has the absolute right to choose for himself the mode of conveyance he desires, whether it be by wagon or carriage, by horse, motor or electric car, or by bicycle, or astride of a horse, subject to the sole condition that he will observe all those requirements that are known as the law of the road.”

Swift v City of Topeka, 43 U.S. Supreme Court says No License Necessary To Drive Automobile On Public Highways/Streets No License Is Necessary Copy and Share Freely YHVH.name 4 Kansas 671, 674. The Supreme Court said in U.S. v Mersky (1960) 361 U.S. 431: An administrative regulation, of course, is not a “statute.” A traveler on foot has the same right to use of the public highway as an automobile or any other vehicle.

Cecchi v. Lindsay, 75 Atl. 376, 377, 1 Boyce (Del.) 185. Automotive vehicles are lawful means of conveyance and have equal rights upon the streets with horses and carriages.

Chicago Coach Co. v. City of Chicago, 337 Ill. 200, 205; See also: Christy v. Elliot, 216 Ill. 31; Ward v. Meredith, 202 Ill. 66; Shinkle v. McCullough, 116 Ky. 960; Butler v. Cabe, 116 Ark. 26, 28-29. …automobiles are lawful vehicles and have equal rights on the highways with horses and carriages. Daily v. Maxwell, 133 S.W. 351, 354.

Matson v. Dawson, 178 N.W. 2d 588, 591. A farmer has the same right to the use of the highways of the state, whether on foot or in a motor vehicle, as any other citizen.

Draffin v. Massey, 92 S.E.2d 38, 42. Persons may lawfully ride in automobiles, as they may lawfully ride on bicycles. Doherty v. Ayer, 83 N.E. 677, 197 Mass. 241, 246;

Molway v. City of Chicago, 88 N.E. 485, 486, 239 Ill. 486; Smiley v. East St. Louis Ry. Co., 100 N.E. 157, 158. “A soldier’s personal automobile is part of his ‘household goods[.]’

U.S. v Bomar, C.A.5(Tex.), 8 F.3d 226, 235” 19A Words and Phrases – Permanent Edition (West) pocket part 94. “[I]t is a jury question whether … an automobile … is a motor vehicle[.]”

United States v Johnson, 718 F.2d 1317, 1324 (5th Cir. 1983). Other right to use an automobile cases: –

EDWARDS VS. CALIFORNIA, 314 U.S. 160 –

TWINING VS NEW JERSEY, 211 U.S. 78 – WILLIAMS VS. FEARS, 179 U.S. 270, AT 274 – CRANDALL VS. NEVADA, 6 WALL. 35, AT 43-44 – THE PASSENGER CASES, 7 HOWARD 287, AT 492 – U.S. VS. GUEST, 383 U.S. 745, AT 757-758 (1966) –

GRIFFIN VS. BRECKENRIDGE, 403 U.S. 88, AT 105-106 (1971) – CALIFANO VS. TORRES, 435 U.S. 1, AT 4, note 6 –

SHAPIRO VS. THOMPSON, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) – CALIFANO VS. AZNAVORIAN, 439 U.S. 170, AT 176 (1978) Look the above citations up in American Jurisprudence. Some citations may be paraphrased.

This article first appeared on SomeNextLevelShit.com and was authored by Jeffrey Phillips.

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Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958)

U.S. Supreme Court

Kent v. Dulles

Argued April 10, 1958

Decided June 16, 1958

357 U.S. 116

At a time when an Act of Congress required a passport for foreign travel by citizens if a state of national emergency had been declared by the President, and when the Proclamation necessary to make the Act effective had been made, the Secretary of State denied passports to petitioners because of their alleged Communistic beliefs and associations and their refusal to file affidavits concerning present or past membership in the Communist Party.

Held: The Secretary was not authorized to deny the passports for these reasons under the Act of July 3, 1926, 22 U.S.C. § 211a, or § 215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1185. Pp. 357 U. S. 117 -130.

(a) The right to travel is a part of the "liberty" of which a citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 357 U. S. 125 -127.

(b) The broad power of the Secretary under 22 U.S.C. § 211a to issue passports, which has long been considered "discretionary," has been construed generally to authorize the refusal of a passport only when the applicant (1) is not a citizen or a person owing allegiance to the United States, or (2) was engaging in criminal or unlawful conduct. Pp. 357 U. S. 124 -125, 357 U. S. 127 -128.

(c) This Court hesitates to impute to Congress, when, in 1952, it made a passport necessary for foreign travel and left its issuance to the discretion of the Secretary of State, a purpose to give him unbridled discretion to withhold a passport from a citizen for any substantive reason he may choose. P. 357 U. S. 128 .

(d) No question concerning the exercise of the war power is involved in this case. P. 357 U. S. 128 .

(e) If a citizen's liberty to travel is to be regulated, it must be pursuant to the lawmaking functions of Congress, any delegation of the power must be subject to adequate standards, and such delegated authority will be narrowly construed. P. 357 U. S. 129 .

(f) The Act of July 3, 1926, 22 U.S.C. § 211a, and § 215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1185, do not delegate to the Secretary authority to withhold passports to

Page 357 U. S. 117

citizens because of their beliefs or associations, and any Act of Congress purporting to do so would raise grave constitutional questions. Pp. 357 U. S. 129 -130.

(g) The only Act of Congress expressly curtailing the movement of Communists across our borders, §§ 2 and 6 of the Internal Security Act of 1950, has not yet become effective, because the Communist Party has not registered under that Act, and there is not in effect a final order of the Board requiring it to do so. P. 357 U. S. 121 , n. 3, p. 357 U. S. 130 .

101 U.S.App.D.C. 278, 239, 248 F.2d 600, 561, reversed.

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The Bahamas Travel Advisory

Travel advisory january 26, 2024, the bahamas - level 2: exercise increased caution.

Updated with additional water safety information.

Exercise increased caution in The Bahamas due to  crime . 

Country Summary : The majority of crime occurs on New Providence (Nassau) and Grand Bahama (Freeport) islands. In Nassau, practice increased vigilance in the “Over the Hill” area (south of Shirley Street) where gang-on-gang violence has resulted in a high homicide rate primarily affecting the local population. Violent crime, such as burglaries, armed robberies, and sexual assaults, occur in both tourist and non-tourist areas. Be vigilant when staying at short-term vacation rental properties where private security companies do not have a presence.   

 Activities involving commercial recreational watercraft, including water tours, are not consistently regulated. Watercraft may be poorly maintained, and some operators may not have safety certifications.  Always review and heed local weather and marine alerts before engaging in water-based activities. Commercial watercraft operators have discretion to operate their vessels regardless of weather forecasts; injuries and fatalities have occurred. Due to these safety concerns, U.S. government personnel are not permitted to use independently operated jet-ski rentals on New Providence and Paradise Islands.   

Never swim alone, regardless of your age or level of swimming skills.  Keep within your fitness and swimming capabilities. Be mindful of sharks when swimming and engaging in water activities, as there have been recent fatal and non-fatal incidents involving sharks.  Be aware of weather and water conditions and heed local warnings. 

Read the country information page  for additional information on travel to The Bahamas. 

If you decide to travel to The Bahamas:  

• Do not answer your door at your hotel/residence unless you know who it is.  
• Do not physically resist any robbery attempt.  
• Enroll in the Smart Traveler Enrollment Program (STEP)  to receive Alerts and make it easier to locate you in an emergency.  
• Follow the Department of State on Facebook , Twitter , and Instagram .  
• Review the Country Security Report  for The Bahamas.  
• Prepare a contingency plan for emergency and medical situations.  Review the Traveler’s Checklist .  
• Visit the CDC page for the latest Travel Health Information related to your travel.

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What to Do If You Lose Your ID Right Before a Flight

Don't panic.

There are few travel nightmares more terrifying than arriving at the airport without proper identification. If you're currently freaking out in the departures hall, take a deep breath. Although it will likely be an inconvenient process, you'll probably be able to fly even if your government-issued photo ID has been lost or stolen.

Arrive at the airport as early as possible. Passengers traveling without a form of identification will have to go through interviews with TSA officers to establish their identity and most airlines will not refund tickets for people who missed their flights due to a lost ID.

The first step is to explain your situation to an airline representative at the counter. Come prepared with additional forms of identification (credit card, photo business card, student ID, even mail or prescription medication with your name and address). Once the airline representative is satisfied that you are who you say you are, they will issue a boarding pass with a note that you don't have an ID.

Pass through to security and explain the situation to the TSA agents. An agent will likely take you to a second room for additional security screening. "The TSA officer may ask you to complete an identity verification process which includes collecting information such as your name, current address, and other personal information to confirm your identity," according to the TSA website .

If the agent is able to confirm your identity, you will be allowed to pass through security after additional screening.

The process becomes more difficult when flying abroad, as individual countries decide whether or not to allow travelers without identification. Travelers who lose their IDs abroad should immediately contact the closest U.S. embassy for assistance in replacing their passports.

Although it may be too late, the best defense is preparation. If your ID was stolen, obtain a police report. This will detail when and where your identification went missing (providing some proof to your story) and confirm your identity. Travelers should have a photocopy or digital scan of their identification easily accessible. (Consider storing this in a private Dropbox account.) Sign up for the Smart Traveler Enrollment Program (STEP) before leaving for a trip. It will make it easier to get help from the embassy while abroad.

And most importantly: Remain calm and courteous. Airline, security, and immigrations employees are all more likely to help get you on your flight if you're being cooperative.

Related Articles

Crossing state lines to get an abortion is a new legal minefield, with courts to decide if there’s a right to travel

Professor of Law, University of Virginia

Professor of Law, George Washington University

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Almost half of the states in the country have made it harder to get an abortion since the Supreme Court in 2022 overturned the federal right to get an abortion. Fourteen states ban abortions in almost all circumstances, and another eight in almost all cases after 6 to 18 weeks of pregnancy .

Nonetheless, the number of abortions provided in the U.S. has actually grown since the court’s Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization decision, rising 11% since 2020, to over 1 million abortions a year .

This increase can partially be explained by the fact that the number of people who crossed state lines to get abortions more than doubled from 81,000 in 2020 to 171,000 in 2023 .

Justice Brett Kavanaugh wrote in the 2022 Dobbs decision that states cannot legally prevent their residents from going to another state to get an abortion, because he believes there is a “constitutional right to interstate travel.”

The U.S. Constitution does not, however, explicitly recognize a “right to interstate travel.” But the Supreme Court has issued decisions as far back as 1867 that can be interpreted to protect this right – and some scholars are confident that such a right exists.

But that hasn’t stopped states such as Idaho and Tennessee from enacting laws that make it harder to travel for an abortion – and some people have even attempted to legally punish their own partners for traveling to end a pregnancy .

As law professors who teach about reproductive justice , we view attempts to restrict abortion travel as one of the frontiers in the anti-abortion rights movement, raising new legal questions for courts to unravel.

States push to stop abortion travel

Idaho bans abortion at all stages of pregnancy . In April 2023, it also became the first state to impose travel restrictions with what it called an “abortion trafficking” law.

This law prevents people from helping minors who are not their children get abortions – without parental consent – including in another state.

Idaho’s attorney general has interpreted the law to mean that health care providers cannot refer patients to abortion clinics in other states. And based on this interpretation, the new law also means that a grandparent or teacher, for example, could not provide advice to a pregnant teenager.

An abortion access fund and a few others have challenged this law, saying that it violates the First Amendment and infringes on pregnant patients’ constitutional right to travel.

A federal district court temporarily blocked the law from going into effect in November 2023, but the case is currently being appealed at the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals .

More recently, in July 2024, Tennessee enacted copycat legislation , which is also being challenged .

Other states – Alabama, Mississippi and Oklahoma – have considered similar abortion trafficking laws but so far have not enacted any.

A spiraling effect

Idaho’s and Tennessee’s laws don’t directly prevent interstate travel, because they focus on people helping minors get an abortion. But some abortion rights activists still say these laws could lead to more explicit bans on interstate travel for abortion.

In the meantime, four Texas counties and a handful of Texas cities are imposing what they call “ abortion trafficking laws .”

Under these laws, people can sue anyone who travels through their cities or counties to get an abortion in another state. Supporters of these laws describe “abortion trafficking” in broad terms, because as one anti-abortion activist has said, “ the unborn child is always taken against their will ” by a pregnant person.

This understanding of “abortion trafficking” effectively treats the fetus as a person, in line with other fetal personhood efforts by anti-abortion rights groups. They are also carefully crafted to avoid constitutional challenges.

In some cases, it is individual people, not states, who are trying to block people from traveling to get an abortion.

In February 2024 , for example, a man named Collin Davis tried to prevent his ex-partner from traveling from Texas to Colorado to get an abortion .

While Davis failed to prevent the abortion, he later filed a lawsuit to investigate his ex-partner and people who assisted her in having the procedure . His goal is to “ pursue wrongful-death claims against anyone involved in the killing of his unborn child .”

An uncertain future

As the courts consider whether it is legal to ban interstate travel for abortion, it is useful to consider the 1975 Supreme Court case, Bigelow v. Virginia .

This case materialized after a Virginia newspaper published an advertisement for an abortion clinic in New York. The state of Virginia convicted the managing editor for violating a Virginia law that made it a misdemeanor for any person “by publication, lecture, advertisement, or by the sale or circulation of any publication” to encourage getting an abortion.

The Supreme Court struck down the Virginia law as violating the First Amendment, and it also noted that Virginia could not “ prevent its residents from traveling to New York to obtain” an abortion or “prosecute them for going there .” This language about the right to travel was not, however, essential to the court’s final decision, so it can’t necessarily be relied upon.

The Bigelow case was also decided just a few years after Roe v. Wade established a constitutional right to abortion. Such a right no longer exists after Dobbs.

This legal situation raises uncertainty about whether and how the Supreme Court would protect the right to travel for abortion.

States trying to protect abortion rights

There are approximately 22 states that have responded to other states’ abortion bans and other restrictive measures on interstate travel by adopting statutes called “shield” laws. These laws seek to prevent states with abortion bans from investigating their residents’ efforts to get an abortion in the shield state.

Along these same lines, the Biden administration issued a rule in 2024 that protects the privacy of people’s personal health information with respect to abortion when such care is legal.

The Dobbs decision returned the question of abortion to the states. But it has not settled many other legal issues related to abortion, such as whether there is a right to travel to get an abortion.

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5 Times Premium Economy Is Worth the Splurge

It’s no secret that air travel isn’t the most comfortable mode of transit, especially when you fly Economy. While most Business- and First-class cabins still offer a spacious taste of luxury, a seat can cost three to five times more than one in Economy — squarely out of the budget for most folks.

Enter Premium Economy, the near-perfect happy medium.

What Is Premium Economy?

Premium Economy — also sometimes called Premium Select or simply Premium — is a mid-point offering available on most international airlines, including Delta, United, and American. 

While it does not include the lay-flat beds or coursed-out meal service of Business or First, a Premium Economy ticket offers a notable step up from Economy: Expect reclining seats with footrests along with elevated food and beverage service, pre-boarding privileges, and space at the front of the cabin. 

When is Premium Economy worth the splurge? 

When the Price Is Right

The next time you book a flight, compare the price difference among Economy, Premium Economy, and Business class. In a recent search for roundtrip flights between Paris (CDG) and New York (JFK), Delta quoted $832 for Economy; $1,492 for Premium Economy; and $2,360 for Business. 

While the jump from $831 to $1,492 is significant, if you’re considering an upgrade, a Premium Economy ticket offers some added comfort for 79% more. Compare that to the nearly 300% price increase for Business Class.

A solid hack can be found using miles, which consistently offers more bang for your buck. For the same route between Paris and New York, you can upgrade to Premium Economy for as low as 37,500 miles (depending on when you fly).

When factoring in the average airline mile’s value at approximately one cent, the cost of the upgrade can be as low as $375 — cutting the original $660 bump from Economy in half.

If you have status, keep an eye out for upgrade deals offered by the airline. 

On Budget-Friendly Airlines

Although budget-friendly airlines often get a bad rap, don’t rule them out for international flights to Europe and the Caribbean. 

Take French bee : The budget airline offers direct flights between Paris Orly and a handful of major U.S. cities, including San Francisco, Los Angeles, and New York, for as low as $448.80 per person one way in Premium Economy. 

When Premium Economy is booked as a roundtrip, the price is essentially the same as a roundtrip Economy fare on most major airlines, and it offers the equivalent upgrades: priority boarding, checked baggage included, elevated meal service with Champagne, and reclinable seats with footrests. 

Taking a Red-eye or Traveling 6+ Hours 

Most passengers are able to withstand the discomfort of Economy seating for a few hours. However, if you’re traveling more than six hours — especially on an overnight flight where sleep is desirable — then upgrading to a Premium Economy seat can make a major difference. 

Although the splurge may seem unnecessary at booking, consider how you’ll feel upon arriving after a red-eye. If you’re someone who has trouble adjusting to new time zones or who doesn’t handle sleep deprivation well, a sleepless flight can cost you a day or two of your trip. If springing for Premium Economy will improve your chances of sleeping on an overnight flight, you’re more likely to hit the ground running. 

If You Want a Better Meal 

In-flight meals tend to leave a lot to be desired, but Premium Economy’s offerings generally fall somewhere between Economy and Business. Most airlines include a fresh appetizer, protein, vegetables, and carbohydrates, along with a small serving of cheese and dessert. Best of all, it also comes with unlimited beverages, including wine, Champagne, and basic spirits with mixers. 

In some cases, Premium Economy meals offer a local touch, according to Daphné Tournadre McGinnis, French bee’s In-Flight Customer Experience Director: “Our meals spotlight our destinations, such as French, American, Reunionese, or Tahitian.

If You’re a Sensitive Traveler

Beyond the comfort of reclinable seats and footrests, most Premium Economy seats are built individually (contrary to the attached seat style of Economy) — meaning you won’t feel your neighbor’s every move for the duration of the flight. Additionally, most Premium Economy cabins come with remote controls for the in-flight entertainment systems, so your behind-the-seat neighbor won’t be pushing the back of your seat to control the volume on their movie selections. 

Bonus points? Book the bulkhead Premium Economy seat if possible, especially if you’re a window-seat lover. These allow enough legroom to get up and move about the cabin without having to bother your neighbor. 

Find the best deals!

Fourteenth Amendment , Section 1:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Challenges to durational residency requirements have traditionally been made under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . In 1999, however, the Court approved a doctrinal shift, so that state laws that distinguished between their own citizens, based on how long they had been in the state, would be evaluated instead under the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . 1 Footnote Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502–03 (1999) . The Court did not, however, question the continuing efficacy of the earlier cases.

A durational residency requirement creates two classes of persons: those who have been within the state for the prescribed period and those who have not. 2 Footnote Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 334 (1972) . Because the right to travel is implicated by state distinctions between residents and nonresidents, the relevant constitutional provision is the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Article IV, § 2, cl. 1. But persons who have moved recently, at least from state to state, 3 Footnote Intrastate travel is protected to the extent that the classification fails to meet equal protection standards in some respect. Compare Hadnott v. Amos , 320 F. Supp. 107 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (three-judge court), aff’d. per curiam , 405 U.S. 1035 (1972) , with Arlington County Bd. v. Richards, 434 U.S. 5 (1977) . The same principle applies in the Commerce Clause cases, in which discrimination may run against in-state as well as out-of-state concerns. Cf. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) . have exercised a right protected by the Constitution, and the durational residency classification either deters the exercise of that right or penalizes those who have exercised it. 4 Footnote Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629–31, 638 (1969) ; Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338–42 (1972) ; Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) ; Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 420–21 (1981) . See also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 236–39 (1970) (Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ.), and id. at 285–92 (Stewart and Blackmun, JJ., and Burger, C.J.). Any such classification is invalid “unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.” 5 Footnote Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (emphasis by Court); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375–76 (1971) . The constitutional right to travel has long been recognized, 6 Footnote Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868) ; Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (both cases in context of direct restrictions on travel). The source of the right to travel and the reasons for reliance on the Equal Protection Clause are questions puzzled over and unresolved by the Court. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758, 759 (1966) , and id. at 763–64 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting), id. at 777 n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629–31 (1969) , and id. at 671 ((Harlan, J., dissenting); San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 31–32 (1973) ; Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 417–19 (1981) ; Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60 & n.6 (1982) , and id. at 66–68 (Brennan, J., concurring), 78–81 (O’Connor, J., concurring). but it is only relatively recently that the strict standard of equal protection review has been applied to nullify durational residency requirements.

Thus, in Shapiro v. Thompson , 7 Footnote 394 U.S. 618 (1969) . durational residency requirements conditioning eligibility for welfare assistance on one year’s residence in the state 8 Footnote The durational residency provision established by Congress for the District of Columbia was also voided. 394 U.S. at 641–42 . were voided. If the purpose of the requirements was to inhibit migration by needy persons into the state or to bar the entry of those who came from low-paying states to higher-paying ones in order to collect greater benefits, the Court said, the purpose was impermissible. 9 Footnote 394 U.S. at 627–33 . Gaddis v. Wyman , 304 F. Supp. 717 (N.D.N.Y. 1969) , aff’d sub nom. Wyman v. Bowens, 397 U.S. 49 (1970) , struck down a provision construed so as to bar only persons who came into the state solely to obtain welfare assistance. If, on the other hand, the purpose was to serve certain administrative and related governmental objectives—the facilitation of the planning of budgets, the provision of an objective test of residency, minimization of opportunity for fraud, and encouragement of early entry of new residents into the labor force—then the requirements were rationally related to the purpose but they were not compelling enough to justify a classification that infringed a fundamental interest. 10 Footnote 394 U.S. at 633–38 . Shapiro was reaffirmed in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (striking down durational residency requirements for aliens applying for welfare assistance), and in Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (voiding requirement of one year’s residency in county as condition to indigent’s receiving nonemergency hospitalization or medical care at county’s expense). When Connecticut and New York reinstituted the requirements, pleading a financial emergency as the compelling state interest, they were summarily rebuffed. Rivera v. Dunn , 329 F. Supp. 554 (D. Conn. 1971) , aff’d per curiam , 404 U.S. 1054 (1972) ; Lopez v. Wyman , Civ. No. 1971-308 (W.D.N.Y. 1971) , aff’d per curiam , 404 U.S. 1055 (1972) . The source of the funds, state or federal, is irrelevant to application of the principle. Pease v. Hansen, 404 U.S. 70 (1971) . In Dunn v. Blumstein , 11 Footnote 405 U.S. 330 (1972) . But see Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973) , and Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973) . Durational residency requirements of five and seven years respectively for candidates for elective office were sustained in Kanapaux v. Ellisor , 419 U.S. 891 (1974) , and Sununu v. Stark , 420 U.S. 958 (1975) . where the durational residency requirements denied the franchise to newcomers, such administrative justifications were found constitutionally insufficient to justify the classification. 12 Footnote For additional discussion of durational residence as a qualification to vote, see Amdt14.S1.8.6.2 Voter Qualifications. The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was the basis for striking down a California law that limited welfare benefits for California citizens who had resided in the state for less than a year to the level of benefits that they would have received in the state of their prior residence. 13 Footnote Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 505 (1999) .

However, a state one-year durational residency requirement for the initiation of a divorce proceeding was sustained in Sosna v. Iowa . 14 Footnote 419 U.S. 393 (1975) . Justices Thurgood Marshall and William Brennan dissented on the merits. Id. at 418 . Although it is not clear what the precise basis of the ruling is, it appears that the Court found that the state’s interest in requiring that those who seek a divorce from its courts be genuinely attached to the state and its desire to insulate divorce decrees from the likelihood of collateral attack justified the requirement. 15 Footnote 419 U.S. at 409 . But the Court also indicated that the plaintiff was not absolutely barred from the state courts, but merely required to wait for access (which was true in the prior cases as well and there held immaterial), and that possibly the state interests in marriage and divorce were more exclusive and thus more immune from federal constitutional attack than were the matters at issue in the previous cases. The Court also did not indicate whether it was using strict or traditional scrutiny. Similarly, durational residency requirements for lower in-state tuition at public colleges have been held constitutionally justifiable, again, however, without a clear statement of reason. 16 Footnote Starns v. Malkerson , 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970) , aff’d per curiam , 401 U.S. 985 (1971) . Cf. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 & n.9 (1973) , and id. at 456, 464, 467 (dicta). In Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 256 (1974) , the Court, noting the results, stated that “some waiting periods . . . may not be penalties” and thus would be valid. More recently, the Court has attempted to clarify these cases by distinguishing situations where a state citizen is likely to “consume” benefits within a state’s borders (such as the provision of welfare) from those where citizens of other states are likely to establish residency just long enough to acquire some portable benefit, and then return to their original domicile to enjoy them (such as obtaining a divorce decree or paying the in-state tuition rate for a college education). 17 Footnote Saenz v. Roe , 526 U.S. at 505 .

A state scheme for returning to its residents a portion of the income earned from the vast oil deposits discovered within Alaska foundered upon the formula for allocating the dividends; that is, each adult resident received one unit of return for each year of residency subsequent to 1959, the first year of Alaska’s statehood. The law thus created fixed, permanent distinctions between an ever-increasing number of classes of bona fide residents based on how long they had been in the state. The differences between the durational residency cases previously decided did not alter the bearing of the right to travel principle upon the distribution scheme, but the Court’s decision went off on the absence of any permissible purpose underlying the apportionment classification and it thus failed even the rational basis test. 18 Footnote Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) . Somewhat similar was the Court’s invalidation on equal protection grounds of a veterans preference for state employment limited to persons who were state residents when they entered military service; four Justices also thought the preference penalized the right to travel. At’y Gen. of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986) .

Still unresolved are issues such as durational residency requirements for occupational licenses and other purposes. 19 Footnote La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S. 465 (1919) , upholding a two-year residence requirement to become an insurance broker, must be considered of questionable validity. Durational periods for admission to the practice of law or medicine or other professions have evoked differing responses by lower courts. But this line of cases does not apply to state residency requirements themselves, as distinguished from durational provisions, 20 Footnote E.g. , McCarthy v. Phila. Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 424 U.S. 645 (1976) (ordinance requiring city employees to be and to remain city residents upheld). See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 255 (1974) . See also Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983) (bona fide residency requirement for free tuition to public schools). and the cases do not inhibit the states when, having reasons for doing so, they bar travel by certain persons. 21 Footnote Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412 (1981) (statute made it a misdemeanor to abandon a dependent child but a felony to commit the offense and then leave the state).

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Your Hotel Is on Strike. What Should You Do?

With hotel chains and union members locked in a dispute over wages and working conditions, strikes could continue to disrupt travel in major U.S. destinations. Here’s what to know.

By Derek M. Norman

Over the busy Labor Day weekend, at least 10,000 unionized front-desk workers, housekeepers and other employees at dozens of hotel properties across the country walked off the job after failing to come to an agreement in contract negotiations.

The mostly two- and three-day strikes affected some Hilton, Hyatt, Marriott and Fairmont hotels in nine destinations, including Baltimore; Boston; Greenwich, Conn.; Honolulu; Kauai, Hawaii; San Diego; San Francisco; San Jose, Calif.; and Seattle.

With members of the UNITE HERE union at Hilton, Hyatt, Marriott and Omni properties across the country still engaged in contentious talks over wages and working conditions, rolling strikes could possibly disrupt travel plans for months to come.

Hotels chains say they plan to keep affected properties open, perhaps with modified services. But they may not always notify travelers that a strike is happening, so inquire ahead of time, or you may be surprised to find a spirited picket line in front of your hotel when you arrive.

Here’s what else you need to know.

There’s a strike at the hotel where I have a reservation. What should I do?

First, call the hotel and ask to speak to a manager to confirm that a strike is taking place there. UNITE HERE has also created a website, FairHotel.org , that offers an updated map of which properties are experiencing labor disputes. Ask the manager which services are being affected by the strike, and ask about the hotel’s cancellation policy.

Then decide if you still want to stay at the hotel.

Besides weighing the effect on services, consider your feelings about the dispute itself, said Bjorn Hanson, an adjunct professor at the New York University Jonathan M. Tisch Center of Hospitality. Some travelers like to support the business and keep their reservation at the property, Dr. Hanson said. Others prefer to support the striking workers by not crossing a picket line.

If you choose not to stay at the affected hotel, he said, you should first book new accommodations and then call your original hotel as soon as possible to cancel.

In the case of past strikes, Dr. Hanson said, “Individual hotels have some discretion, but the hotel company policy was: Whatever our cancellation policy is, is the policy we will maintain during the strike. So at the very least, that is what the regular, average traveler should keep in mind and plan around,” he said.

The cancellation policy at Hilton , Hyatt , Marriott and Omni hotels generally depends on your specific rate and dates of your stay, so you’ll need to look up your reservation on their app or website.

Will my hotel stay open during the strike?

In general, hotels say they are prepared to operate without disruption.

Representatives for Hyatt, Hilton and Omni all said that they had contingency plans to minimize any strikes’ impact on hotel operations. Marriott did not respond to request for comment.

While the chains would not reveal details of those plans, they are likely to use nonunion employees, Dr. Hanson said. They might also, for example, substitute a grab-and-go buffet for table service. And outside contractors may be hired to perform services that hotel staff would typically perform.

During another recent major hotel strike, last summer in Los Angeles, thousands of hotel workers walked off the job just as travelers were gearing up for the Fourth of July. That first strike was resolved after three days . Sporadic walkouts at other properties throughout the summer affected housekeeping services for some guests and caused disruptions after event organizers canceled events .

What are the sticking points in the talks?

Hotel workers are calling for higher wages, as well as the reversal of Covid-era staffing and service cuts. Housekeepers at the Hilton Baltimore Inner Harbor , for example, are asking for a raise to $20 an hour from $16.20 now.

During the pandemic, the union said, many hotels cut staffing and guest services like daily housekeeping and room service , which caused some workers to lose income and also created a heavier workload for the remaining employees.

Follow New York Times Travel on Instagram and sign up for our weekly Travel Dispatch newsletter to get expert tips on traveling smarter and inspiration for your next vacation. Dreaming up a future getaway or just armchair traveling? Check out our 52 Places to Go in 2024 .

An earlier version of this article misstated the number of hotel properties that were on strike as of Sunday afternoon. It was 24, not more than 25.

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Derek M. Norman is a senior news assistant for the International section of The Times. More about Derek M. Norman